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A CRITIQUE OF THE MARITAL
PRIVILEGES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
MARITAL PRIVILEGES IN THE UNITED
STATES MILITARY THROUGH THE STATE
AND FEDERAL APPROACHES TO THE
MARITAL PRIVILEGES
I. INTRODUCTION

Michelle, a developmentally challenged teen-ager who adored her
older sister Kathy McCollum, begged and pleaded with her mother until
she agreed to allow her to spend the summer with Kathy.' During her
sister's visit, Kathy ensured that Michelle bathed herself, ate properly,
performed basic household chores, and that Michelle never left the yard
or house alone. One night that summer, Kathy woke up to find that her
husband was not in bed. She found him in the living room, but what she
saw shocked and dismayed her. Michelle, her fourteen-year-old sister,
was lying on the floor with her nightgown above her waist, rubbing her
stomach. Her husband, Terry, a Staff Sergeant in the United States Air
Force, was sitting on the couch in his underwear watching Michelle.
The next morning, Kathy approached Michelle and asked her if she
had had sex with anyone since she came to visit. Michelle, scared and
nervous, answered "No" until Kathy explained to her that she was not in
any trouble. Michelle then reluctantly admitted that "Yes," she had had
sex with someone. She identified the person as Terry and explained, "I

I The hypothetical situation presented is based on the facts surrounding the unreported
court-martial of United States v. McCollumn. Because Michelle was a minor when this
incident occurred, her name and her sister's first name have been changed to protect
Michelle's true identity. Staff Sergeant McCollum pleaded not guilty to two specifications
of rape and one specification of indecent acts with a minor. Denise Spaulding, SJ Supply
NCO Convicted of Rape Charge, Others, SEYMOUR JOHNSON WRIGHT TIMES, Aug. 4, 2000, at 8.

Staff Sergeant McCollum was found guilty of raping a child, engaging in unlawful carnal
knowledge of a child, and indecent acts with a child. Id. He received a sentence of 18 years
confinement at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a reduction in grade to airman basic, and a
dishonorable discharge. Id. Additionally, he had to forfeit all his pay and allowances. Id.

119

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2001], Art. 3

120 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 36

didn't want to, but he made me." 2 Kathy then approached her husband
with the allegation that he had raped her sister. 3 Terry angrily denied
the accusation, until Kathy informed him that Michelle had already told
her the truth about what had happened. Kathy demanded to know how
he could have done this to Michelle and to their families. His only
MicheUe's situation was not an isolated case of abuse, nor was her failure to report the
incident unique. In the United States alone, a child is sexually assaulted every two minutes
and for every child who reports the abuse, nine do not. Monique K. Cirelli, et al., Expert
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Helpful or Prejudicial? People v. Beckley, 8 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 425, 425 (1991). Girls, as compared to boys, have a greater risk of being
sexually abused, particularly by family members, while boys have a greater risk of being
sexually abused by non-family members. Kathryn Kuehnle, et al., Child Protection
Evaluations: The Forensic Stepchild, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 368, 377-78 (2000).
Furthermore, children who do not live with their biological mother are three times more
likely to be sexually abused than those children living with their biological mother. Id. at
379. In 1997, there were over three million cases of child abuse reported to Child Protective
Services nationwide. See Jillian Grossman, The Fourth Amendment: Relaxing the Rule in Child
Abuse Investigations, 27 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1303, 1303 (2000). Of this number, Child
Protective Services confirmed 1,045,000 reports of child abuse with 22% being physical
abuse, 8% sexual abuse, 54% neglect, 4% emotional abuse, and 12% other forms of
maltreatment. Id. at 1303 n.2. Child molestation, however, is one of the nation's most
under-reported crimes. Manvinder Gill, Protecting the Abused Child: It is Time to Reevaluate
Judicial Preferencefor Preserving ParentalCustody Rights Over the Rights of the Child to be Free
from Physical Abuse and Sexual Exploitation, 18 J. Juv. L. 67, 70 (1997). Several factors
combine to make it difficult to prove child sexual abuse. See Jeanine Lewis, Chapter417: The
Welfare of Children--A Higher PriorityThan Family Reunification, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 561,
563 (2000). The abuse generally occurs in private, by a trusted relative, and physical
evidence is rare thus, leaving most courts with the child's word against that of the
defendant. Id. In addition, the child is then forced to testify against that relative in a
formal and unfamiliar courtroom. Id. Even the Supreme Court has recognized that
"[cihild abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part
because there are often no witnesses except the victim." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39, 60 (1987); see also Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that "in
two-thirds of child abuse cases, the incident is never even reported").
Michelle's molestation by a family member is also not unusual. See Lewis, supra note 2, at
563 (indicating most of the perpetrators of child abuse are either the child's parents or some
other relative); Veronica Serrato, Note, Expert Testimnony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions:
A Spectruim of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158 (1988) (describing the vast majority of sexual
abuse cases as involving intrafamilial abusers who are in trusted positions, such as fathers,
stepfathers, mothers' boyfriends, or other adults with easy access to the child's home).
After the abuse, an increasing number of children are moving in with relatives, godparents,
and other individuals who are close to the children's parents. Howard A. Davidson, Child
Protection Policy and Practiceat Century's End, 33 FAM. L.Q. 765, 778 (1999). It is estimated
that in the twenty-first century, the majority of children placed by child welfare agencies
will reside in these "kinship care" homes, rather than foster homes. Id. Presently, there are
over half a million children in foster care. Cristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back Into
the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287,
288.
2
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response was "I don't know." Then, when Kathy expressed her concern
that Michelle could be pregnant, Terry responded "No, she can't be
pregnant because I didn't ejaculate."
The McCollums divorced several years later, although for reasons
unrelated to Terry's behavior toward Michelle. After the divorce was
finalized, while the Air Force was investigating a separate rape charge
against Staff Sergeant McCollum, the government discovered that he
also might have raped Michelle. 4 When the Air Force brought charges
against him under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), Kathy
was willing to testify about her conversations with her husband.5 Staff
Sergeant McCollum objected to her testimony on grounds that it violated
Military Rule of Evidence 504(c)(2)(A), which only allows a spouse to
testify about confidential marital communications when "one spouse is
charged with a crime against the person or property of the other spouse
or a child of either." 6 Because Michelle was Kathy's sister, Michelle was
not within the scope of the exceptions to the privilege, and therefore
Kathy was not allowed to testify as to any of the confidential
communications between herself and her husband. 7 The prosecution,

The rape charges against Staff Sergeant McCollum were not an isolated incident in the
military. See Alfred F. Arguilla, Crime in the Home, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1988, at 3, 3 n.5. The
number of courts-martial involving child sexual offenders has dramatically increased in
recent years. Id. In 1974, only one inmate at the United States Disciplinary Barracks, at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, was incarcerated for child sexual abuse. Id. However, in December
1987, there were 255 inmates who had been convicted of child sexual abuse. Id. Of these
offenses, approximately 35% were directed at children outside the family, unrelated by
either blood or marriage to the offender. Id. Servicemembers are rarely tried by courtmartial for child abuse that does not also include sexual abuse. Id. at 6-7. The primary
justification for this decision is that these are the most serious offenses in "terms of
abhorrence to society and the maximum possible confinement." Id. at 7. Courts-martial
statistics reveal that most victims of child sexual abuse are children who are at least twelve
years old because older children tend to be more likely to report the abuse and make better
witnesses. Id. at 8.
5 The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") is located at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (1994).
"The Uniform Code of Military Justice establishes the basic structure of the military justice
system." Gregory E. Maggs, Judicial Revieu of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 160 MIL. L.
REV. 96, 96 (1999). Specifically, it delineates the requirements for convening a courtmartial, establishes the jurisdiction of courts-martial, and identifies the offenses that a
court-martial may punish. Id.
6 The focus of this Note is on the applicability of Military Rule of Evidence 504(c)(2)(A)
("MRE") to non-traditional families where the child residing with the accused is neither a
child of the accused nor of the accused's spouse.
7 Here again, Michelle's situation is not an isolated incident. Between July 1, 1986, and
June 30, 1987, there were 532 substantiated cases of intrafamilial child sexual abuse in the

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2001], Art. 3

122 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36

however, argued that the exception to the privilege should be extended
to include situations where a spouse acts as the guardian or in loco
parentiss over a child. 9 The military judge rejected this argument and
consequently found many of Staff Sergeant McCollum's statements to his
wife inadmissible. 10
This Note examines the disparity in the military justice system,
which allows the testimony of one spouse when the other is charged
with an offense against "a child of either [spouse]," but not when the
servicemember is charged with the same crime against other children
who may be living in the same home." Part H addresses the basic
principles of the UCMJ, including the general procedures for convening
a court-martial, and outlines the basic differences between the Military
Rules of Evidence ("MRE") and the Federal Rules of Evidence. 12 It also
United States military. Arguilla, supra note 4, at app. A. Intrafamilial crimes are those
involving abuse committed by an offender against his or her child or stepchild. Id. During
this same period, there were 2832 substantiated cases of extrafamilial child sexual abuse.
Id. Extrafamilial crimes generally involve a victim other than the offender's child or
stepchild. Id.
8 In loco parentis is defined as "acting as a temporary guardian of a child." BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999).

9 Privileges are justified on various grounds, including protecting the family status. See
discussion infra Part II.B.1. While courts have not addressed what constitutes a family for
this purpose, this issue has been addressed in other contexts. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494,499,502 (1977) (finding unconstitutional a zoning ordinance
that defined as unrelated a grandmother and her two grandsons, who were first cousins,
because the ordinance infringed the rights of the extended family). However, in Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000), the Supreme Court did recognize that "[tihe demographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The
composition of families varies greatly from household to household... [ulnderstandably,
in ... single-parent households, persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with
increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing." Id. at 63-64.
10 The military judge found some of Staff Sergeant McCollum's statements admissible
because she determined that such statements were not confidential since the information
was meant to be transmitted to a doctor.
11 In this Note, servicemember refers to any person who is subject to the UCMJ. This
primarily includes personnel on active duty, reservists while on active or inactive duty
training, and retirees who are entitled to pay. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1994) (listing which
people are subject to the UCMJ). As of 1989, there were 3,500,000 individuals subject to the
UCMJ. See Military Justice and Article Ill, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1909, 1909 (1990) [hereinafter
Military Justice].
12 See discussion infra Part II.A. The MRE may be found in the MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL: UNITED STATES (2000) [hereinafter MCM]. The Court of Military Appeals has
described the MCM as the military lawyer's "Bible" because it would be virtually
impossible to conduct a court-martial without referring to the MCM. Maggs, supra note 5,
at 97; see also United States v. Dunnahoe, 21 C.M.R. 67, 75 (C.M.A. 1956) (referring to the
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provides a brief history of the marital privileges, describes the
requirements for the adverse testimonial privilege or the confidential
communications privilege, and examines the federal and military case
law describing the exception to the marital privileges when the offense is
against a child. 13 In Part III, this Note describes the competing state
approaches for such an exception, asserts the need for an amendment to
MRE 504(c)(2)(A) so that a child under the custody or control of either
spouse is covered by the exception, and identifies the justifications for
amending MRE 504(c)(2)(A).14 Part IV then provides a proposed
amendment to MRE 504(c)(2)(A), explains the meaning of custody or

MCM as "our Bible"); United States v. Drain, 16 C.M.R. 220, 222 (C.M.A. 1954) (describing
the MCM as "the military lawyers' vade mecum-his very Bible"). There have, however,
been over one hundred reported instances where the defense or government counsel
requested that a court invalidate or ignore MCM provisions. Maggs, supra note 5, at 98.
Because the rules in the MCM may determine the outcome of a criminal trial or the
sentence length, the judiciary gives such challenges serious attention. Id. Most of these
challenges are asserted by the accused who does not want a rule of evidence or procedure
to apply to that case, and therefore, may look for grounds for invalidating that provision.
Id. at 101. Government counsel will rarely contest the validity of MCM provisions. Id. at
102. Even though individuals may not favor all of the evidentiary rules or procedures, they
will not contest the provision because the MCM states official policy. Id. Additionally,
government attorneys rarely have authority to question such requirements, even if such
requirements make conviction more difficult. Id. Nothing, however, in the UCMJ or any
other statute identifies the grounds for invalidating provisions in the MCM. Id. at 103. The
Joint Services Committee on Military Justice ("JSC") is responsible for preparing and
evaluating proposed amendments to the MCM on an annual basis. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, DiREcTIVE No. 5500.17(3) (1996). The JSC is also responsible for ensuring that the
MCM "applies the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases in United States district court to the extent practicable and to the
extent that such principles and rules are not contrary to, or inconsistent with, the UCMJ."
Id. Any interested person is allowed to submit proposed changes to the UCMJ or the MCM
to the JSC. Military Justice Fact Sheets, at http://sja.hqmc.usmc.mil/JAM/MJFACTSHTS.
htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2001). The JSC was responsible for the original codification of the
MRE. Frederic I. Lederer, The Militanj Rules of Evidence: Origins and Judicialhnplemnentation,
130 MIL. L. REV. 5, 9 (1990). In fact, the JSC was originally established to keep the MCM
current with developments in the law. Id. The JSC evaluates proposals for change
throughout the year and forwards any proposals to the Department of Defense General
Counsel's Office. Id. Once the JSC has completed its annual review, notice of the proposed
changes are published in the Federal Register. Id. at 12. After the public notice and
comment period, the recommended proposals and modifications are reviewed. Id. Based
on that information, the JSC prepares a draft Executive Order for the President. Id.; see also
discussion infra Part II.A.
13 See discussion infra Parts IlB-C. For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the
requirements of the confidential communications privileges were established.
14 See discussion infra Part Ill.
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control, and describes how such an amendment would affect children
like Michelle. s
II. BACKGROUND

Servicemembers charged with violating the UCMJ are prosecuted by
the United States of America in a court-martial.1 6 These criminal
proceedings are governed by the MRE. 17 The MRE recognize two
different marital privileges: the adverse testimonial privilege and the
confidential communications privilege. 18 Before either privilege will
apply, however, certain requirements must be established. 19 This Part
explains the basic procedures and practices of the military justice system,
describes the history, justifications, and requirements of the adverse
testimonial and confidential communications privileges, and examines
federal and military case law describing the exception to the marital
privileges for offenses involving children.
A. The Military Criminal Justice System
The military justice system is a unique system with crimes,

procedures, and sanctions that differ from the civilian criminal justice
system.20 The military justice system was designed with the dual

discussion infra Part IV.
1h See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 362 (defining a court-martial as an "ad hoc
military court, convened under military authority, to try and punish those who violate the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, particularly members of the armed forces").
17 Lederer, supra note 12, at 39.
18See discussion infra Part II.B.
19 See infra notes 99-106, 122-30 and accompanying text (describing the requirements for
each privilege).
2D0DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1-1, at 2
(5th ed. 1999). The separate military justice system has been justified on the ground that
the worldwide deployment of large numbers of military members with unique disciplinary
requirements mandates a flexible, separate system that is capable of operating during peace
or conflict. See id. Additional justifications include the need for the instant mobility of
servicemembers, the need for a speedy trial in order to avoid any loss of witnesses due to
combat needs and effects, and the peculiar nature of military life. 1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN &
FREDERIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE § 1-20.00, at 3 (1991). Even the Supreme
Court has recognized that the "military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from
civilian society ... [the Court has] also recognized that the military has, again by necessity,
developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 743 (1974); see also Andrew M. Ferris, Comment, Military Justice: Removing the
Probabilityof Unfairness,63 U. CIN. L REV. 439, 443-53 (1994) (tracing the evolution of the
military justice system).
15 See
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purposes of promoting justice and establishing discipline. 21 Although
there are significant differences between the military and civilian
criminal systems, procedurally the military system functions in a fashion
similar to civilian criminal courts. 22
The military justice system has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes
committed by servicemembers.23 This jurisdiction extends to crimes

See MCM, supra note 12, at I-1. To be precise, "[the purpose of military law is to
promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to
promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to
strengthen the national security of the United States." Id. But, "[w]ithin the armed forces,
'discipline' is not a pejorative term." 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 20, §1-30.00 at 5.
"[Discipline] means an attitude of respect for authority developed by precept and by
training." Id. These goals are not always harmonious because traditionally those most
interested in discipline are likely to emphasize the prompt obedience of orders, while those
most interested in justice will focus on accuracy and fairness in punishing individual
offenders. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he need for special regulations in
relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and justification for a special and
exclusive system of military justice" as too obvious to require extensive discussion because
"no military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would
be unacceptable in a civilian setting". Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983); see also
21

John S. Cooke, 156 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1998) (discussing the meaning and importance of

discipline in the military).
22 See 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 20, § 1.20.00, at 2 (characterizing the military
justice system as "justice based" with the major procedural elements paralleling civilian
law and meeting substantive due process requirements). Congress enacted the UCMJ as a
result of substantial public and legislative displeasure with the unjustness of the military
criminal justice system during World War II. Id. at 15-16. The military criminal justice
system lacks a significant noncriminal component, contains unique military offenses,
applies to all offenses committed by servicemembers, maintains worldwide jurisdiction to
ensure the easy transfer of personnel, and is generally uniform throughout the armed
forces. Id. at 2; see also Jacob Hagopian, The Uniform Code of Military Justice in Transition,
ARMY LAW, July, 2000, at 1, 1-3 (describing the differences between the current UCMJ and
the WWII provisions).
23 See 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 20, § 2-22.10, at 45. The UCMJ establishes the
various types of offenses: the punitive articles contain offenses common to civilian life
such as homicide, burglary, assault, and rape; as well as offenses unique to military service
such as desertion, absence without leave, failure to obey orders or regulations; and combat
offenses such as compelling surrender, misbehavior before the enemy, aiding the enemy,
and misconduct as a prisoner. The text of these offenses is found in Articles 77-134 of the
UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1994 & Supp. 1999). Additional punishable offenses include
"conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" and the General Code which includes
all those acts not specifically listed in the other punitive articles, but that are to the
"prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, and all conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces." 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-934. The text of conduct
unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is found in Article 133 of the UCMJ, while the
General Article is found in Article 134. 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34. Article 133 includes conduct

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2001], Art. 3

126 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36

committed during peacetime, on leave, off the premises of a military
installation, in civilian apparel, and those against civilians. 24 A
servicemember charged with a violation of the UCMJ is tried by a courtmartial.25 This procedure is initiated by an investigation into the charges
and completed by a determination of guilt or innocence. 26
When a commanding officer is informed that a servicemember under
his or her command is alleged to have violated a provision of the UCMJ,
the commander must either personally make a preliminary inquiry into
the suspected charges, or ensure that such an inquiry occurs. 27 The
commander then decides whether to court-martial the servicemember or
take some other remedial action. 28 If the commander decides to court-

punishable by other punitive provisions, so long as those acts also constitute conduct
unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman. See SCHLUETER, supra note 20, § 2-9(C)(3), at
105. The General Code includes, but is not limited to, assault, adultery, cohabitation,
fraternization, indecent acts, and prostitution. Id.; see also United States v. Woods, 28 M.J.
318, 319-20 (C.M.A. 1989) (finding a violation of Article 134 when a servicemember
engaged in unsafe sexual intercourse). Jurisdiction over nonmilitary crimes is concurrent
with state and federal courts, so a military installation will generally have an agreement
with the local civilian authorities concerning the investigation and prosecution of such
crimes by servicemembers. Military Justice, supra note 11, at 1910 n.7.
24 Military Justice, supra note 11, at 1910; see also Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 44951 (1987) (holding a court-martial was properly convened to try a servicemember who was
a member of the armed forces at the time the offense was charged, even though the offense
was not service related).
23 See supra note 16. There are three tiers of courts in the military justice system. Ferris,
supra note 20, at 452-53. The highest court is the Court of Military Appeals which is
composed of five civilian judges, who serve fifteen-year terms after being appointed by the
President and approved by the Senate. Id. Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court, if the Supreme Court grants certiorari. Id. at 455. The
Court of Military Appeals reviews cases from the four Courts of Military Review (Army,
Navy-Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force). Id. at 453. These courts are responsible
for reviewing the decisions of the general, special, and summary courts-martial. Id.; see also
infra note 28 (describing the various types of courts-martial).
2 See RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 303 ("RCM") in the MCM at 11-19, supra note 12.
2 Id. Although anyone subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges, the accused's immediate
commanding officer usually informally investigates the alleged violation of the UCMJ. See
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, at xiii (4th ed. 1997)
[hereinafter MILITARY RULES]; see also 10 U.S.C. § 830(a)(1-2) (1994) (describing the
procedure for preferral). The commander will usually obtain legal advice from a judge
advocate to ensure that the case is strong enough to support a conviction. SCHLUETER,
supra note 20, §1-7 at 35. The commander does not want acquitted servicemembers'to
return to the unit and claim "victory" over the commander. Id.
23 See I GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 20, §1-46.00 at 18; SCHLUETER, supra note 20, §1-7 at
35. Non-court-martial options include administratively discharging the servicemember,
recommending reassignment, extra training, or nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of
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the UCMJ. See 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1994); 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 20, §146.00, at 18.
Article 15 of the UCMJ establishes that "any commanding officer may, in addition to or in
lieu of admonition or reprimand, impose... disciplinary punishments for minor offenses
without the intervention of a court-martial." 10 U.S.C. § 815(b). If a servicemember
demands a court-martial in lieu of Article 15 punishment prior to the imposition of the
punishment, the punishment may not be imposed and the servicemember must be courtmartialed. 10 U.S.C. § 815(a). If the commander decides to convene, or order, a courtmartial, the court-martial is only convened to hear a single case. SCHLUETER, supra note 20,
§1-7, at 35. A court-martial is not part of the federal judiciary, but is an Article I court, and
is therefore not subject to direct judicial review by the federal judiciary. Id. Courts-martial
are courts of criminal jurisdiction, and their findings are binding on other federal courts.
Id. There are three different types of courts-martial with limitations as to who may
convene each type and the punishment that may be imposed. See generally 10 U.S.C. 88
822-824 (1994) (describing who has the power to convene general courts-martial, special
courts-martial, and summary courts-martial). A summary court-martial is limited in scope
to non-capital offenses and the maximum punishment that may be imposed is confinement
for one month, hard labor without confinement for forty-five days, restriction to specified
limits for two months, or forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one month. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1994).
In addition, a servicemember may not be subject to a summary court-martial without his or
her permission. 10 U.S.C. § 820. If a servicemember objects to being tried by a summary
court-martial that servicemember may be tried by a special or general court-martial. 10
U.S.C. § 820.
The summary court-martial only has jurisdiction over enlisted
servicemembers. Michael H. Gilbert, Siininanj Courts-Martial: Rediscovering the Spiunoni of
Military Justice, 39 A.F. L. REV. 119, 122 (1996). The summary court-martial is particularly
useful when a servicemember "needs to be taught a swift lesson that will serve as a
message to others about to fall off the precipice of good order and discipline." Id. A
special court-martial may impose punishment for non-capital offenses by any
servicemember; however, punishment is limited to confinement for one year, hard labor
without confinement for three months, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month, or forfeiture
of pay for one year, and a bad-conduct discharge. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1994). The punishment
to be imposed on anyone subject to a general court-martial is any punishment not
otherwise specifically forbidden, including the death penalty when specifically authorized
by the crime. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994). Before a general court-martial may be convened, a
pre-trial investigation, called an Article 32 hearing, must be conducted, and a legal opinion
as to the disposition of the charges must be given to the convening authority. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 832 (1994). This hearing is meant to guarantee the servicemember is not tried on baseless
charges. Larry A. Gaydos, A Conprelwnsive Guide to the Military Pretrial Investigation, 111
MIL L. REV.49,50 (1986). The Article 32 hearing is to be held by an impartial investigating
officer who is then disqualified from subsequently serving as trial counsel, military judge,
or member of the panel on that case. Id. at 59,65. The accused is entitled to be represented
by counsel at an Article 32 hearing. Id. at 66. The MCM specifically disqualifies the accuser
from being the investigating officer. Id. at 60; see also RCM 405(d)(1) in the MCM, supra
note 12, at 11-34. The general courts-martial procedure requires free representation by a
qualified attorney at all trial and appellate proceedings, automatic appeal at no cost, and
full disclosure of all relevant evidence at all stages of the proceedings. See United States v.
Fluellen, 40 M.J. 96, 98 (C.M.A. 1994) (guaranteeing the accused effective assistance of
counsel at pretrial, trial and post-trial proceedings); Hagopian, supra note 22, at 3. The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel only applies to general and special courts-martial, not to
summary courts-martial. Maggs, supra note 5, at 153; see also 10 U.S.C. § 827(a)(1) (1994)
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martial the servicemember, a military judge will typically preside over
the trial. 29 Military trial counsel will prosecute the case and the accused
will be represented by either military defense counsel, at no expense to
the accused, or by civilian counsel at the accused's expense. 3°

(specifying that "[tirial counsel and defense counsel shall be detailed for each general and
special court-martial").
See 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1994); Military Justice, supra note 11, at 1911. The military judge is the
equivalent of a United States district court judge. Ferris, supra note 20, at 455. Military
judges are selected from a pool of eligible military lawyers. Id. at 482. In non-capital cases,
the defendant may waive a hearing before a jury and be tried by military judge alone.
Hagopian, supra note 22, at 3. However, this request must be approved by the military
judge. Id. The servicemember does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Maggs, supra note 5, at 150-51; see also United States v. Guilford, 8 M.J. 598, 601 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. 1979) (stating "the right to a trial by jury as contemplated by the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to military trials of members of the armed forces in active
service"). But under the Sixth Amendment, both the court-martial and the Article 32
hearing are open to the public. Id.; see also ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F.
1997) (finding the Article 32 hearing open to the public and press "unless future compelling
circumstances" dictate a different result); United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433,435 (C.M.A.
1985) (finding the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applicable to servicemembers).
The jury is a panel of servicemembers, who are selected by the convening authority. See 10
U.S.C. § 825 (1994); Military Justice, supra note 11, at 1911. This method of selecting the
panel has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Guy P. Glazier, He Called for His Pipe, and He
Called for His Bowl, and He Called for His Members Three-Selection of Military Juries by the
Sovereign: Inpediment to Military Justice, 157 MIL. L. REV. 1, 66-106 (1998) (criticizing the
panel selection as breeding unlawful command influence and as unconstitutional for
failing to select a panel representing a fair-cross section of servicemembers). The panel
must consist of at least five servicemembers senior or equal in rank to the accused. Military
Justice, supra note 11, at 1911. All active duty servicemembers are eligible to serve on a
panel; however, only commissioned officers are authorized to serve on a panel when the
accused is a commissioned officer. Stephen A. Lamb, The Court-Martial Panel Selection
Process: A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103, 126 (1992). If the accused is enlisted, he or
she may request a panel composed of at least one-third enlisted servicemembers, so long as
there are no military circumstances that prevent enlisted members from serving. Id.
However, no panel member will be junior in rank to the accused if the situation can be
avoided. Id. The panel's purpose is to determine not only the verdict, but also the
sentence. See RCM 1006 in the MCM, supra note 12, at 11-134; Military Justice, supra note 11,
at 1911. A conviction only requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the members, except in
cases where the law mandates the death penalty where a unanimous verdict is then
required to convict. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 852(a)(1)-(3) (1994); see also United States v. Gay, 16
M.J. 586, 600 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1983) (finding a vote of two-thirds of the panel for the
death penalty was unconstitutional). Simply because a servicemember may be sentenced
to death by a panel containing less than twelve members does not make the military death
penalty system unconstitutional. See Dwight H. Sullivan, Playing the Numbers: CourtMartial Panel Size and the Military Death Penalty, 158 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998).
See 10 U.S.C. § 838 (1994); Military Justice, supra note 11, at 1911. The accused may plead
guilty with the military judge's approval. See Terry L. Elling, Guilty Plea Inquiries: Do We
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While the Federal Rules of Evidence govern civilian cases, a courtmartial follows the MRE. 31 Article 36 of the UCMJ gives the President
the power to create regulations governing a court-martial. 32 This power,
however, is subject to the limitation that the President must, as far as
practicable, apply the evidentiary rules that apply to criminal trials in the
district courts to courts-martial. 33 The MRE are, therefore, substantially
the same as the Federal Rules of Evidence, with a major distinction being
that the MRE adopted many of the proposed specific privileges which
Congress rejected when it adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. 34
Important in the context of this Note are the differences in the
spousal privileges as adopted by the military.35 This Note will focus on
MRE 504(c)(2)(A), which provides:
[there is no adverse testimonial or confidential
communications privilege] [iun proceedings in which
one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or
property of the other spouse or a child of either, or with
a crime against the person or property of a third person

Care Too Much?, 134 MIL. L. REV. 195 (comparing aspects of guilty plea inquires in courtsmartial to those in federal district courts).
3 See MILITARY RULES, supra note 27, at xi; Lederer, supra note 12, at 5. The MRE not only

govern trials by courts-martial but also guide law enforcement personnel and commanders
in their daily need to protect the rights of military members. Lederer, supra note 12, at 39.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern state court decisions. FED. R. EVID. 101.
- See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1994); SCHLUETER, supra note 20, §1-1(B) at 7.
33 See 10 U.S.C. § 836; SCHLUETER, supra note 20, §1-1(B) at 7. The President shall "as he
considers practicable, apply the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the United States district courts." 10 U.S.C. § 836.
3 See MILITARY RULES, supra note 27, at xii; Lederer, supra note 12, at 13. The MRE also
codify the law of interrogations and confessions, search and seizure, and eyewitness
identification. 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supranote 20, §21-21.00 at 872-873; see also infra notes
72-83 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
One of the goals in creating the MRE was to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence in courtsmartial. Lederer, supra note 12, at 10. Colonel Alley, the "father" of the MRE, intended that
the codification of the MRE would not only reflect the Federal Rules of Evidence, but also
"that all future military evidentiary law echo it as well, unless a valid military reason
existed for departing from it." Id. at 6, 13.
-" See Lederer, supra note 12, at 16 (describing the origin of the privilege rules as coming
from the 1969 MCM, the unenacted Federal Rules of Evidence dealing with privileges, and
also partially from scratch).
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committed in the course of committing a crime against
the other spouse.36
Under this rule, a servicemember charged with a crime against "a
child of either spouse" would be prevented from invoking either the
adverse testimonial privilege or the confidential communications
privileges. 37
B. The Marital Privileges
Privileges apply during all stages of court proceedings, and only the
holder of the privilege has the power to assert or waive the privilege. 38
A privilege may involve the refusal to testify, the refusal to produce
evidence, or the invocation of the right to prevent other people from
producing evidence. 39 There are two distinct marital privileges: the
adverse testimonial privilege that prevents a spouse from being
compelled to testify against the other spouse, and the confidential
communications privilege that prevents a spouse from testifying about
any confidential communications. 40 Thus, the adverse testimonial
privilege is the broader of the two privileges because it prohibits the
testimony of any facts by a spouse, even if those facts are not learned
through confidential marital communications. 41 However, the adverse
testimonial privilege can also be considered more restrictive than the
confidential communications privilege as it only applies to adverse
testimony by a spouse, while the confidential communications privilege

MIL. R. EvID. 504(c)(2)(A). Also of importance is MRE 501(d) which recognizes both the
codified privileges and those "principals of common law generally recognized in the trial
of criminal cases in the United States district courts pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence insofar as the application of such principles in trials by courts-martial is
practicable and not contrary to or inconsistent with the code, these rules, or this Manual."
MIL. R. EVID. 501(d). This rule thus allows for the adoption of new privileges as they are
adopted by federal district courts. Lederer, suipra note 1Z at 27.
37MILITARY RULES, supra note 27, at 655, 657.
3s See I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 73.1, at 272 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); see
also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LARD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE
RULES, § 5.1, at 399 (1999).
39 GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY, § 501.3, at 198 (1999).
40 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.1, at 399; WEISSENBERGER, supra note 39, §
501.6, at 215.
"1 See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2334, at 85 (1923) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON ANGLO

AMERICAN EVIDENCE]; David M. Lawson, Evidence, 45 WAYNE L REV. 883,895 (1999).
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may be invoked by a spouse in any proceeding, even when the spouse
invoking the privilege is not a party to the proceeding. 42
1. The General Role and Justifications of Privileges
Privileges differ from most evidentiary rules because privileges
exclude relevant evidence that would aid in the search for truth since
society considers the protection of some relationships to be more
important than the search for the truth.43 The law of privileges is,
therefore, based upon policy considerations that exist independently
from the usual evidentiary concerns of the accuracy and reliability of
evidence. 4 Because privileges limit the admissibility of evidence, the
courts or the legislatures must consider the privileges to be necessary to
protect some other compelling interest. 45 As a result, a variety of
justifications have been developed to explain the existence of
privileges. 46 Most evidentiary rules have as their ultimate justification
the promotion of the objectives established in the witness oath: "the

42 See 5 WIGMORE ON ANGLO AMERICAN EVIDENCE, supra note 41, § 2334, at 85. Professor

Wigmore described these two privileges as having "practically nothing in common, either
in policy or in rule" and emphasized the need for the complete separation of these
privileges. Id.
43 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.1, at 399. Sometimes the extent to which
privileges interfere with the fact-finding process is exaggerated because if a communication
would not have been made without a privilege, the existence of a privilege does not cause
any loss of evidence. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 72, at 269. Besides, the
refusal to recognize a privilege does not guarantee the disclosure of truth, but possibly
invites perjury. Id.
n
4 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 39, § 501.3, at 198. There are a variety of privileges in
addition to the spousal privileges which are not addressed in this Note. The goal or
purpose of these privileges is encouraging individuals in need of assistance to seek help.
Erica Smith-Klocek, A Halachic Perspective on the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 CATH. LAW. 105,
115 (1999). These privileges include the attorney-client privilege, the clergyman-penitent
privilege, and the doctor-patient privilege. Id.
45 Shonah P. Jefferson, Note, The Statutory Development of the Parent-ChildPrivilege: Congress
Responds to Kenneth Starr's Tactics, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 432 (1999); see also 1
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 72, at 269. The word privilege is derived from
the Latin phrase privata lex which has been defined as "a private law applicable to a small
group of persons as their special prerogative, or as a particular and peculiar benefit or
advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or class beyond the common advantages of
others." See Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly a New or
Revolutionanj Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583,590 (1987).
Watts, supra note 45, at 590 (referring to society's recognition that protecting privileged
relationships is more valuable than the goal of seeking the truth).
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truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." 47 Consequently,
privileges are controversial because they inhibit the common law
principle that "the public has a right to every man's evidence."4
The justification, or rationale, for recognizing most of the nonconstitutional privileges is the protection of confidential relationships. 49
More recently developed justifications include the need for encouraging
the free flow of information in certain relationships and protecting the
privacy of those relationships. 50 Such justifications are not without
criticism because some scholars argue that such interests are insufficient
when balanced against the need to obtain otherwise unobtainable
evidence.51 These justifications have also been criticized because the
openness of communications in personal and professional relationships
depends more on the level of trust between the participants, than on the

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 72, at 269. The exclusionary rules such as
the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, and the rule excluding bad character as evidence of the
defendant having committed a crime have as their purpose the pursuit of truth. Id. This
purpose is sought by excluding unreliable, misleading or prejudicial evidence. Id.
48Nissa M. Ricafort, Note, Jaffe v. Redmond: The Supreme Court's Dramatic Shift Supports the
Recoguition of a Federal Parent-Child Privilege, 32 IND. L REV. 259, 260 (1998).
49 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 39, § 501.3, at 199. This justifies the existence of the marital
privileges. Id. Professor Wigmore argued that the justifications for marital privileges were
created "ex post facto, for rules so simple and so long accepted, could hardly have been
believed, but for the recorded utterances." 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw, § 2228, at 3037 (1904) [hereinafter
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE]. He further argued that this idea was entertaining because of the
"solemn absurdity of explanations which do not explain and of justifications which do not
justify, and because of the fantastic spectacle of a fundamental rule of evidence, which
never had a good reason for existence, surviving none the less thrdugh two centuries." Id.
Accordingly, artificial and after the fact justifications were accepted simply because
everyone agreed that the privileges existed and that there was good reason for the
privileges to exist, but it was not important to name that good reason. Id. According to
Professor Wigmore, only two justifications deserve serious consideration. Id. at 3039. The
first is the danger of disturbing family peace. Id.He rejected this justification because
family peace does not depend on the existence of this privilege. Id. Furthermore, to the
extent that a family might be affected, such a result should not stand in the way of justice.
Id. The second justification is the "natural repugnance" to reasonable people of forcing a
spouse to condemn the other spouse. Id. at 3040. He considered this to be the real reason
for maintaining the adverse testimonial privilege, even though based upon sentiment. Id.
50MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, ssupm note 38, § 5.1, at 400; see also WELSSENBERGER, supra note
39, § 501.3, at 199.
511 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 86, at 311 (stating "[d]elicacy and decorum
while worthy and deserving of protection" are insufficient interests when "there is a need
for otherwise unobtainable evidence critical to the ascertainment of significant legal
471

rights").
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existence of some privilege. 52 However, the existence of other
circumstances, such as the level of trust between the parties, does not
negate the fact that the communication may be significantly influenced
by the existence of a privilege.5 3
Privileges have also been justified on the grounds that they are
necessary to protect privacy, freedom, trust, and honor in personal and
professional relationships. 54 By protecting these relationships and
values, the courts and legislatures have indicated that even though the
search for truth is of critical importance, other societal interests may be
more important.55 The history of the marital privileges provides a good
example of this balance between conflicting values because the meaning
of many of these privileges have not remained constant but have been
56
restricted and modified as a result of changing societal interests.
2. History
of the
Adverse
Communications Privileges

Testimonial

and

Confidential

The two marital privileges have a related history. 57 The confidential
communications privilege developed as a result of increasing limitations
or restrictions to the adverse testimonial privileges 8 However, it was not
until there was a disparate application of the privileges between various
jurisdictions that there were developed codified rules in an attempt to
create national unity. 59

§ 5.1, at 401.
Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979) (indicating
the incentive to confide "is at least partially dependent upon the client's ability to predict
that the communication will be held in confidence").
54 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.1, at 400-01. Privileges provide a way to
maintain privacy in an increasingly intrusive society. Id. § 5.1, at 402. A compelled breach
of loyalty would create a sense of betrayal adversely affecting both the person
communicating and the person listening to such communications. Id.
55 Id. at 400. Certain privacy interests are worth protecting, regardless of whether the
privilege actually affects the conduct within the protected relationships. See 1 MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 72, at 270. Thus, the confidential communications privilege
is justified on the basis it serves to protect the privacy of certain societally important
relationships. Id.
56 See generally 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 2227, at 3034-36 (describing the
history of the marital privileges).
57 Familial Privileges, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1564-65 (1985).
52

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38,

53

58 Id. at 1565.

-" Ricafort, supra note 48, at 262.
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The early common law considered a spouse incompetent to testify,
either for or against the other spouse. 60 This result was the product of
combining the common law rule disqualifying a party from testifying on
his own behalf with the legal fiction that a husband and wife were one
person. 61 The spousal disqualification doctrine that regarded a spouse to

be incompetent to testify as a witness in any capacity was ingrained in
both American and English common-law. 62 It was not until Funk v.
United States63 that the Supreme Court abolished the spousal
incompetency doctrine, thus allowing a spouse to testify on behalf of, but
not against, the other spouse. 64 The Court reasoned that because
defendants were allowed to testify on their own behalf, there was no
6
longer a good reason to prevent their spouses from doing the same. 5
Witness disqualification based upon an interest in the proceeding had
already been abolished as a result of the modem decisions allowing
interested parties to testify, but the courts left the question of credibility

60 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 78, at 293; WEISSENBERGER, supra note
39, § 501.6, at 215. The history of the marital privileges goes back to ancient Jewish and
Roman law. Watts, supra note 45, at 598. No record seems to exist for the precise time of
the origin of the privileges nor the process by which the privilege to choose not to testify
against a spouse developed. 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, slpra note 49, § 2227, at 3034.
61 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 66, at 253; WEISSENBERGER, supra note
39, § 501.6, at 215; see also In re Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 1986);
Ricafort, supra note 48, at 260. This privilege has historically been used to bar the testimony
of wives against husbands. Richard 0. Lempet, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, reprinted
in AN EVIDENCE ANTHOLOGY 183 (Edward J. Imwinkelried & Glen Weissenberger eds.,
1996).
62 Ricafort, supra note 48, at 260.

England finally abolished the spousal incompetency
doctrine by the Evidence Amendment Act of 1853, replacing it with a privilege that forbade
either spouse from being compelled to testify about any communication made by either
spouse during the marriage. Id. The Evidence Amendment Act of 1853 also enacted that
"no husband shall be compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife
during the marriage, and no wife shall be compellable to disclose any communication
made to her by her husband during the marriage." 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supranote
38, § 78, at 293.
- 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
64 Id. at 386. The petitioner had been convicted for conspiracy to violate the prohibition
law. Id. at 373. At his trial, he called his wife as a witness to testify on his behalf, but the
court refused to allow her to testify based upon the spousal incompetency doctrine. Id. In
Funk, the Court identified the sole issue as "whether in a federal court the wife of the
defendant on trial for a criminal offense is a competent witness [to testify on] his behalf."
Id.
65 Id. at 380-81. The basic reason for the prior exclusion of testimony by a spouse was the
practice of disqualifying any witness with an interest in the case. Id. The Court reasoned
that by refusing to allow a spouse to testify while allowing the defendant spouse, who had
a greater interest in the outcome, to testify created an inconsistency. Id. at 381.
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for the jury." The Court still excluded the adverse testimony of a spouse
because such testimony by a spouse would destroy the marriage, thus
resulting in the creation of the adverse testimonial privilege. 67
The second marital privilege is the confidential communications
privilege.6 This privilege arose during the 1850s as a result of the
limited application of the adverse testimonial privilege. 69 This privilege
also stemmed from the state legislatures' recognition of the need for the
explicit protection of confidential martial communications. 70

Id. The Court recognized that the federal courts, in the absence of legislation had the
power to declare the current rule, based upon current standards, without regard to
previous determinations of what the law had been. Id. at 382. The Court further reasoned:
The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if
they are to rest upon reason-is their adaptation to the successful
development of truth ... since experience is of all teachers the most
dependable, and since experience also is a continuous process, it
follows that a rule of evidence at one time thought necessary to the
ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding
generation whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the
fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule.
Id. at 381.
66

67 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.31, at 534; WEISSENBERGER, supra note 39, §

501.6, at 215. Professor Wigmore explained that the adverse testimonial privilege arose
independently and prior to the development of the spousal disqualification rule. See 3
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 2227, at 3034; Familial Privileges, supra note 57, at
1564. Professor Wigmore suggested the true origin of the privilege was the late sixteenth
century social and legal acceptance of the husband as the head of the household. See 3
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 2227, at 3035; Fainilial Privileges, suopra note 57, at
1564. At that time if a wife or servant harmed the head of the household, the wife or
servant could be charged with petit treason. See 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, §
2227, at 3035; Familial Privileges, supra note 57, at 1564-65. Therefore, to permit a wife or
servant to indirectly commit such a crime and cause the death of the head of the household
would have been irrational. See 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 49, § 2227, at 3035;
Familial Privileges,supra note 57, at 1565.
" Lawson, supra note 41, at 895.
69Familial Privileges, supra note 57, at 1565. One reason for this may be that the spousal
disqualification rule and the adverse testimonial privilege covered most attempts to
introduce evidence that were also confidential communications. Id. Once the spousal
disqualification rule was abolished, many states recognized the need for the confidential
communications privilege. Id. These privileges have been criticized on the ground that
they have a disparate gender impact because they predominantly prevent women from
testifying more than men. See id. at 1587; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the
Meanings of Marriage,81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2144 (1995).
70 FamilialPrivileges,supra note 57, at 1565.
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The development of privileges by state courts and legislatures
resulted in a wide disparity of approaches to these privileges. 71 This
disparity resulted in a call for national reform and the creation of
uniform rules of evidence.72 Congress had previously granted the
Supreme Court the power to promulgate uniform rules for the federal
courts' 3 Congress, however, retained the discretion to accept or reject
the rules as proposed, or to make amendments.74 After the Supreme
Court adopted the Advisory Committee's Draft of the proposed Rules of
Evidence, there was intense congressional debate on the privilege
section.75 One of the major issues of concern was that the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence failed to include some privileges, such as the
physician-patient and the confidential marital communications
privileges. 76 This was controversial because some legislators thought it
was irrational to provide a spouse with the protection of the adverse
testimonial privilege if the marriage was already in jeopardy, especially
when the non-defendant spouse was willing to testify." Another issue
of concern was that the proposed privileges would apply in diversity
cases, as well as other cases where state law provided the rules for
decision, thus abrogating state privilege laws. 8

71 Ricafort, supra note 48, at 262.
72

Id.

See Edward J. lmwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73
NEB. L. REV. 511,512 (1994).
74 Id. This power had been exercised by the Supreme Court without incident for forty
years. Id. However, this good working relationship disintegrated when the Supreme
Court approved the Federal Rules of Evidence as drafted by the Advisory Committee. Id.
In particular, the privilege section was considered to be "extremely controversial" and was
subject to intense criticism Id. at 513; see also Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate on Federal Rules of Evidence H.R. 5463, 93rd
Cong. 356 (1974) (Senate Judiciary Comm. Staff Memorandum).
73 lmwinkelried, supra note 73, at 513. The proposed rules would have recognized nine
non-constitutional privileges: required reports, lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient,
spousal, communication to clergypersons, political vote, trade secrets, state secrets, and
identity of informer. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE §§ 502.02 - 51OApp.01 [4), at 502-1 - 51OApp.-13 (2001). The proposed rules would
have narrowed the existing privileges and restricted judicial development of privileges by
freezing federal privilege law and denying federal courts the power to create new
privileges. lmwinkelried, supra note 73, at 518.
76 See MILITARY RULES, supra note 27, at 504; lmwinkelried, supranote 73, at 518.
77 MILITARY RULES, supra note 27, at 405.
78 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supranote 38, § 5.6, at 423.
73
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The Advisory Committee decided not to adopt the confidential
communications privilege because the Committee considered this
privilege to be ineffective as most married people are generally unaware
of its existence and therefore do not rely on it when communicating with

a spouse. 79 When enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress

chose not to adopt specific privileges that the federal courts would be
bound to recognize, but instead chose to adopt a broader view. 80
Consequently, Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which
established that privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the
common law" as interpreted "in the light of reason and experience."81
However, Congress made it clear that the rejection of the enumerated
privileges was not meant to indicate disapproval of such privileges. 2
Instead, Congress intended that the privileges were to remain in their
current state, unless modified by the decisions of the federal courts.s

The evolution of federal decisions regarding the martial privileges
subsequently established the existence of the adverse testimonial
privilege and the confidential communications privilege. 4
3. The Adverse Testimonial Privilege8 5

The adverse testimonial privilege establishes the right of a spouse to
refuse to testify against his or her spouse; thus, a court cannot compel a

79 Id. § 5.32, at 561.
80 See Ricafort, supra note 48, at 263.
81 FED. R. EviD. 501. This last phrase gives the courts the power to look to state statutes
when making decisions. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 76.1, at 284;
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.6, at 435. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1980) (holding that the adverse testimonial privilege belongs only to the
witness spouse and giving substantial weight to the trend in state legislation and judicial
decisions toward such a rule).
B Ricafort, supra note 48, at 264. Congress refused to adopt a rule that would have
prohibited the judicial development of new privileges. Id.
3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.6, at 424.
" Id. § 5.31 at 553; 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL,
at 631 (6th ed. 1994) [hereinafter FEDERAL RULES]. Because these privileges exclude
information by denying the litigant evidence necessary to prove a charge, privileges should
be construed to exclude no more evidence than necessary to meet the goals for which the
privilege was created. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supranote 38, § 5.1, at 403.
9sAlthough the adverse testimonial and the confidential communication privileges overlap
in practice, in reality they are different doctrines and supported by different justifications.
FamilialPrivileges, supra note 57, at 1564.
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86
spouse to testify and adversely affect the interests of the other spouse.
87
In Hawkins v. United States, the Supreme Court refused to allow a
person to be compelled to testify against his or her spouse.88 In addition,
the Court refused to allow the voluntary testimony of a spouse without
the consent of the other spouse.89 The Court reasoned that the law
refused to pit spouses against each other because of the need to protect
family harmony. 90 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that family
harmony would be disrupted as much by voluntary testimony as by
compelled testimony.91

Twenty years later, in Trammel v. United States,9 the Court again
addressed the issue of whether the accused may invoke the adverse
testimonial privilege to exclude the voluntary testimony of a spouse.93

,See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.31, at 553; Regan, supra note 69, at 2053.
The adverse testimonial privilege is designed to protect the marital harmony at the time the
testimony would be given. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.31, at 553.
7 358 U.S. 74 (1958).

0 Id. at 79. The petitioner was convicted of violating the Mann Act by transporting a girl
across state lines for immoral purposes. Id. at 74. Despite his objection, the government
called his wife as a witness against him. Id. at 74-75. The Court refused to find that time
and changing legal practices had undermined this rule, as the Court had found in Funk
when it rejected the spousal incompetency doctrine. Id. at 79; see also supra notes 63-67 and
accompanying text (discussing Funk v. United States).
89 Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 78; see Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A WitnessCentered Rationale, 14 WIs. WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1999) (proposing a witness-centered rationale
for preserving privileges).
90 Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77. The Court refused to "pit wife against husband or husband
against wife" because such a "policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the
benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of public as well." Id.
91 Id. In fact, the Court believed that more bitterness would be created by the voluntary
testimony of a spouse. Id. The Court rejected the government's argument that when a
spouse voluntarily testified against the other spouse it was a strong indication that the
marriage was already beyond a state of repair because the success of reconciliation is proof
"some apparently broken homes can be saved provided no unforgivable act is done by
either party." Id.at 77-78. Therefore, allowing the spouse's adverse testimony would likely
destroy the marriage. Id. at 78. The Court also examined the practice of other jurisdictions
and concluded the limited number of exceptions to this rule proves "that the law should
not force or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further
inflame existing domestic differences." Id.
-2 445 U.S. 40 (1980).

Id. at 41-42. The Court explicitly noted that it was re-examining Hawkins. Id.at 42. The
petitioner was indicted for importing heroin into the United States and for conspiracy to
import heroin. Id. at 42. Mrs. Trammel was indicted as a co-conspirator because she
allegedly bought the heroin in Thailand and transported it back to the United States. Id.
The heroin was discovered when she was stopped during a routine customs search. Id.
93
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This time, based on "reason and experience," the Court redefined the
adverse testimonial privilege as being held solely by the witnessspouse.94 The Court reasoned that because privileges impede the search

for truth by suppressing evidence, they should be narrowly construed. 95
Furthermore, the Court found that the ancient foundations for this
privilege had disappeared because women were no longer regarded as
property and now possessed an independent legal identity. 96
Additionally, the Court found that the justifications for such a rule were
insufficient because when a spouse was willing to testify against the

other spouse, the marriage was probably in such a state that there was
little harmony left to protect.97 Accordingly, the Court concluded that to
prevent the voluntary testimony of a spouse under such circumstances
would be more likely to frustrate rather than preserve family peace. 98

The adverse testimonial privilege does not apply in every court
proceeding because certain conditions must be established by the spouse
seeking to assert the application of the privilege. First, if the privilege

is to apply, the couple must be lawfully married at the time of the trial.10
She later agreed to cooperate with the government and testify against the defendant, her
husband, when offered immunity. Id.
Id. at 53. The Court reasoned that the long history of this privilege and its effect on
marriage and family relationships suggested that the Court should not casually modify the
privilege. Id. at 48. The Court examined the erosion of the adverse testimonial privilege in
state legislatures and recognized a special relevance in the states "divesting the accused of
the privilege" because "laws of marriage and domestic relations are concerns traditionally
reserved to the states." Id.at 49-50. The Court also relied on Congress' intent "not to freeze
the law of privilege" but to "provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of
privilege on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 47.
9sId. at 50.
% Id. at 52. The Court recognized that this privilege had allowed a man's castle to be
converted into "a den of thieves" because it gave every man "one safe and unquestionable
and every [sic] ready accomplice for every imaginable crime." Id. at 51-52.
97 Id. at 52. The Court stated that "[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify against the other
in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in
disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to
preserve." Id. But this reasoning is not without criticism. Steven N. Gofman, Note,
"Honey, the Judge Says We're Histonj": Abrogating the Marital Privileges via Modern Doctrines of
Marital Worthiness, 77 CORNELL L.REv. 843, 858 (1992). It has been argued that the stress of
a criminal prosecution may create the marital rift leading one spouse to testify against the
other. Id. However, this does not inevitably lead to the end of the marriage since not all
marital problems result in divorce. Id.
" Trainnel, 445 U.S. at 52.
9 Frost, supra note 89, at 12.
100See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.32, at 563; WEISSENBERGER, supra note 39,
§ 501.6, at 217. See, e.g., United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737,74748 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding
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Common law marriages are included within the scope of the privilege
only if the jurisdiction where the couple lives recognizes such marriages
as valid. 101 The existence of the privilege terminates with the end of the
marriage, whether by death, divorce, or annulment. 0 2 Furthermore, the
scope of the adverse testimonial privilege is not absolute. 103 Although
the privilege covers all subjects including those discussed before or
during the marriage, not just confidential marital communications, the
privilege is limited to adverse testimony. 10 4 Therefore, a spouse only has
the right to refuse to answer questions that tend to incriminate the nontestifying spouse1 05 Questions that do not incriminate the other spouse
are not protected because the answers do not threaten the sanctity and
harmony of the marriage. 10 6
Because of the controversy surrounding the exclusion of relevant
evidence, and the resulting hindrance in the search for the truth, there

the existence of either the adverse testimonial privilege or the confidential communication
privilege depends on the "existence of valid marriage, as determined by state law"). But
see Gofman, supra note 97, at 861 (arguing that courts lack the expertise to determine if a
marriage has deteriorated to the point that it no longer deserves protection and that courts
have failed to establish clear standards for determining the viability of a marriage).
1o1See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.32, at 563; see also United States v. Acker,

52 F.3d 509,515 (4th Cir. 1995) (prohibiting the accused from asserting the marital privilege
against a man with whom she had lived for twenty-five years when the state did not
recognize common-law marriages); United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir.
1983) (requiring a valid marital relationship for the adverse testimonial privilege to apply
and indicating this did not include those circumstances where the parties simply lived
together); United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1977) (refusing to grant the
adverse testimonial privilege to parties merely living together); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,

supra note 38, § 5.31, at 556.
102 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 39, § 501.6, at 217; see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1,

6 (1954) (stating that divorce ends "any bar of incompetency"); Yaldo v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 424 F.2d 501, 502 (6th Cir. 1970) (finding the adverse testimonial
privilege terminated by an annulment).
'0 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 39, § 501.6, at 216.
104 Id. at § 501.6, at 216. See 2 FEDERAL RULEs, sitpra note 84, at 632-33; 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 81, at 301; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, §§ 5.31-32, at
553, 563; see also United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (approving an
exception to adverse testimonial privilege for pre-marital acts); United States v. Apodaca,
522 F.2d 568, 570-71 (10th Cir. 1975) (noting the application of the adverse testimonial
privilege would apply to matters occurring prior to marriage but affirming the denial of the
privilege because the marriage was a fraud). But see United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d
1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding that because the testimony concerned matters occurring
prior to the marriage the adverse testimonial privilege did not apply).
'u 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 505.1, at 565 (1996).
1m Id.
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have been several justifications put forth supporting this privilege. The
most common justification for the existence of the adverse testimonial
privilege is the protection of the sanctity and harmony of the marital
relationship. 1°7 Without the privilege, if a spouse was allowed to testify
in a criminal proceeding against the other spouse, such an act would
probably constitute an "unforgivable act" that would seal the end of the
marriage. 10 8 Some commentators suggest that to pit one spouse against
the other, without the consent of either, would violate fundamental
societal values.' 09 Other commentators have argued for the elimination
of this privilege because family harmony is probably already in a state
beyond repair if the spouse is willing to testify against the other
spouse.11 Because the privilege's goal is to protect viable marriages
from such destructive rifts, some courts have refused to apply the
privilege when the court considers the marriage over or damaged
beyond repair.'

107See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.31,

at 554-55; WEISSENBERGER,

supra note

39, § 501.6, at 215.
'08See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.31, at 554-55; WEISSENBERGER, supra note
39, § 501.6, at 215.

'o9
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, suprn note 38, § 5.31, at 555.
1101 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 66, at 254-55. The Court adopted the
confidential communications privilege in two previous cases, but in neither case did the
court adopt the position of substituting the confidential communications privilege for the
adverse testimonial privilege. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Wolfle v.
United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
"'1WEISSENBERGER, snpra note 39, § 501.6, at 217; see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d
389, 396 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that since the accused's spouse had not been with her
husband for two weeks and had not seen him in the eight months between his leaving and
the trial, it was difficult to visualize how preserving the marital bond would have required
her exclusion as a witness); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding that because the marriage in that case was no longer viable, the traditional policy
reasons for the privilege did not exist and refused to apply the privilege); see also In re
Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding such reasoning
followed the Trammel Court's reasoning that this privilege could not be used by a spouse
seeking to stop the voluntary testimony of the other spouse, because when one spouse is
willing to testify against the other, the marriage is obviously beyond repair). But see United
States v. L.illey, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978) (refusing to condition application of the
adverse testimonial privilege on a determination the marriage was happy because such a
finding would create a burden on judicial administration). It has been further argued that
the meaning and purpose of this privilege is not respected when courts deny application of
the privilege because the courts consider the marriage unworthy of this protection.
Gofman, supra note 97, at 871-72.
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4. The Confidential Communications Privilege
The second marital privilege is the confidential communications
privilege.1 12 This privilege refers not to whether a spouse may testify
against the other spouse, but whether a spouse may testify to
confidential communications made between the spouses. 113 Like the
adverse testimonial privilege, the justification for the confidential
communications privilege is the preservation of marital harmony.114

However, unlike the adverse testimonial privilege, the confidential
communications privilege prevents the spouse from testifying about the
conversation, even if the marriage is in a state of disrepair, because the

spouse had a right to rely on marital intimacy when making the
statement.11 5

Additional justifications for the continued existence of this privilege
include the need for encouraging the free flow of information between
spouses and protecting the privacy of marital relationships. 116 The
confidential communications privilege is further justified on the ground
that it protects the privacy and trust that are necessary for the

preservation of marital relationships, and thus, allows spouses to openly

Professor Wigmore analyzed the general principles of any confidential communication
privilege as only applying when four fundamental conditions necessary to the
establishment of the privilege have been established. 5WIGMORE ON ANGLO AMERICAN
112

EVIDENCE, supra note 41, § 2285, at 1; see also Smith-Klocek, supra note 44, at 110-11. First,
the "communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed." See 5
WIGMORE ON ANGLO AMERICAN EVIDENCE, supra note 41, § 2285, at 1; Smith-Klocek, supra
note 44, at 110-11. Second, the "element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties." See 5 WIGMORE ON
ANGLO AMERICAN EVIDENCE, supra note 41, § 2285, at 2; Smith-Klocek, supra note 44, at 11011. Third, the "relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered." See 5 WIGMORE ON ANGLO AMERICAN EVIDENCE, supra note 41, § 2285,
at 1; Smith-Klocek, supra note 44, at 110-11. Fourth, the "injury that would inure to the
relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation. See 5 WIGMORE ON ANGLO AMERICAN
EVIDENCE, supra note 41, § 2285, at 2; Smith-Klocek, supra note 44, at 110-11. Professor
Wigmore recognized that this policy was "amply satisfied" for confidential
communications between spouses. 5 WIGMORE ON ANGLO AMERICAN EVIDENCE, supra note
41, § 2332, at 83.
"11WEISSENBERGER, supra note 39, § 501.6, at 218.
114 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.1, at 400.
115FEDERAL RULES, supra note 84, at 632.
116 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.1, at 400; see also WEISSENBERGER, supra note
39, § 501.3, at 199.
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communicate and confide in each other.117 Critics contend that this
privilege has no real effect on the behavior of married couples since most
individuals are unaware of the existence of such a privilege.1 18
Regardless of whether married couples are aware of the confidential
communications
privilege,
federal
courts
recognize
such
communications between a married couple as privileged.1 19 Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the confidential communications privilege
allows a defendant to prevent his or her spouse from disclosing
confidential statements made between them during the course of the
marriage, even if the spouse wishes to testify about the conversation. 12°

supra note 38, § 5.32, at 560; see also Wolfle v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (describing marital communications "as so essential to the
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the
administration of justice which the privilege entails"). Because this privilege is meant to
promote marital harmony, once the marriage has come to an end, the privilege ends.
United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18,19-20 (2d Cir. 1959).
11SWEISSENBERGER, supra note 39, § 501.6, at 218; see also I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 38, § 86, at 309-310 (stating the anticipation of legal proceedings "is not one of those
factors which materially influence in daily life the degree of fullness of marital
117 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,

disclosures"); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 75, §50SApp.01[2], at 50SApp.-2. advisory

committee note (Proposed Rev. Draft 1971) (acknowledging the confidential
communication privilege is one "of whose existence the parties in all likelihood are
unaware"); Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675, 682 (1929) (indicating that practically no
one but lawyers are aware of the confidential communications privilege and furthermore
that marital harmony among lawyers aware of the privilege was not better than that of
other professionals); Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical
Examnination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CAL L
REV. 1353, 1374-78 (1973) (discussing the validity of the presumption that individuals are
unaware of the privilege). But some commentators have countered these arguments by
noting that even though most couples may be unaware of such a privilege, they
nonetheless expect complete confidentiality and despise the forced disclosure of such
communications. Watts, supra note 45, at 597.
119 See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951) (recognizing that confidential
marital communications are privileged); Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (finding communications
between spouses are assumed to be confidential and therefore privileged unless the
communication was not intended to be confidential). The confidential communications
privilege does not apply when the communicating spouse is attempting to further a crime
or fraud because such a communication is considered to be worth no more protection than
when made to an attorney. FEDERAL RULES, supra note 84, at 633.
'20 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.31, at 553, 560; 2 FEDERAL RULES, supra

note 84, at 631-32. The confidential communications privilege is designed to protect the
privacy and trust in the relationship at the time of the communication. MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.31, at 553, 560; see also United States v. Short, 4 F.3d 475, 478
(7th Cir. 1993) (describing the value that society places on uninhibited communications
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This privilege is, however, limited to confidential communications made
2
during the marriage.1 '
There are three requirements that must be met for this privilege to
apply.' n The party seeking to assert the existence of the confidential
communications privilege has the burden of proving the applicability of
the privilege. 123
First, there must be a valid marriage. 124
This
requirement only includes common law marriages if the jurisdiction
where the couple resides recognizes such marriages as valid.'2 s

between married couples and society's encouragement of married people to confide in each

other).
See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 81, at 301; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 38, §8 5.31-32, at 553-54, 563; 2 FEDERAL RULES, supra note 84, at 632-33; see also
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 56 (1954) (finding a divorce did not terminate the
confidential communications privilege for communications made during the marriage); In
re Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding there was no
privilege when the witness-spouse is permanently separated from the other spouse, even
though not legally divorced or separated); Tenini, 267 F.2d at 20 (excluding postmarital
communications from the confidential communications privilege); State v. Dikstaal, 320
N.W.2d 164, 166 (S.D. 1982) (excluding premarital communications from the confidential
communications privilege). There is also no privilege when the communication occurs
between spouses who are jointly engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Picciandra,
788 F.2d 39,43 (1st Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding the confidential communications privilege did not apply because the spouses were
"joint participants" in a crime). In United States v. Estes, the court explained this exception
as reflecting the idea that a "greater public good will result from permitting the spouse of
an accused to testify willingly concerning their joint criminal activities than would come
from permitting the accused to erect a roadblock against the search for truth." 793 F.2d
465, 468 (2d Cir. 1986).
12 WEISSENBERGER, sltpra note 39, § 501.6, at 219-20.
123 United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1365 (10th Cir. 1997); see also United States v.
Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 1995).
124 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 81, at 301; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 38, § 5.32, at 563.
'2 See, e.g., United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 748 (9th Cir. 1977) (denying the privilege
because Alaska did not recognize common law marriages). A permanent, but not
necessarily legal, separation can negate the application of this privilege. As one court has
stated:
society's interest in protecting the confidentiality of the relationships of
permanently separated spouses is outweighed by the need to secure
evidence in the search for truth that is the essence of a criminal trial,
and that proof of permanent separated status at the time of the
12

communication

.

.

.

renders

the

communications

automatically inapplicable.
United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Second, the privilege only covers communications which are
intended to convey a meaning. 126 A communication may include oral or
written words, sign language, and expressive actions. 127 The definition
of a confidential communication for purposes of this privilege parallels
the definition of nonverbal conduct qualifying as a "statement" for
purposes of the hearsay doctrine. 128 The third requirement is that the
communication must be confidential; therefore, communications
intended to be disclosed to other individuals or made in the presence of
third persons are not privileged. 129
Marital communications are
presumed to be confidential, so the burden is on the prosecution to
prove the lack of confidentiality. 30 Even when all the prerequisites for a
privilege have been established, the privilege may still be inapplicable

126 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 38, § 79, at 296.
127Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that

communications to an incarcerated spouse lack the required expectation of privacy);
United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1445 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that intimate sexual acts
between spouses may be protected by the confidential communications privilege).
However, observations of noncommunicative behavior, appearance, and physical or
emotional conditions are not confidential communications. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 38, § 5.32, at 564.; see, e.g., United States v. Hook, 781 F.2d 1166, 1173 n.11 (6th Cir.
1986) (finding that a husband giving his wife money to pay the bills was not a
communication); United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405,1408 (8th Cir. 1983) (observing LSD
in trunk of car was not a communication); Lustig, 555 F.2d at 748 (reasoning a spouse
observing another spouse engaging in drug transactions was not communicative, even if
drug dealing was a "communication," because the privilege was invalid due to the
presence of third parties whom negated the element of confidentiality).
128 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supranote 38, § 5.32, at 564.
129 See id. at § 5.32, at 565; see, e.g., Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1934)
(reasoning the presence of a stenographer prohibited the application of the confidential
communications privilege because of the accused's voluntary disclosure to that third
person); see also United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding the
presence of a third person destroyed the application of the privilege); United States v.
Parker, 834 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1987) (indicating the confidential communications
privilege did not generally apply to acts); Grulkey v. United States, 394 F.2d 244, 246 (8th
Cir. 1968) (finding a letter to a wife was not confidential because her husband knew she
would need help reading the letter); Master v. Master, 166 A.2d 251, 255 (Md. 1960)
(finding the confidential communications privilege did not apply to statements made by a
husband in the presence of children who were old enough to understand what was said).
But see, e.g., Hicks v. Hicks, 155 S.E.2d 799, 801-02 (N.C. 1967) (deciding the presence of an
eight-year-old child did not destroy the confidentiality of the communication).
130 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (stating that although marital
communications are presumed to be confidential, that presumption may be overcome by
facts showing they were not intended to be private); Marashi,913 F.2d at 730. Additionally,
deliberate disclosure of the communication by the communicating spouse without another
privilege protecting such disclosure results in the waiver of the privilege. United States v.
Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1998).
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because both of the privileges have exceptions for offenses committed
against a spouse or "a child of either spouse."
C. Federally Recognized Exceptions to the Marital Privileges
The recent trend in the area of privileges is to narrow existing
131
privileges, especially by expanding any exceptions to those privileges.
When making a decision whether to recognize an exception to a
particular privilege, the courts generally balance the value of the
privilege with the societal cost of recognizing the privilege.132 As a result
of this balance between conflicting interests, the common law recognized
an exception to the spousal incompetency doctrine for prosecutions

involving a crime against the witness spouse. 33 Courts subsequently
expanded this exception to include prosecutions for violent crimes or
sexual offenses against "a child of either spouse."134 These exceptions to
the marital privileges are designed to compel a spouse to testify when

the other spouse has committed a crime against that spouse or some
third party, especially children. 35 This Part focuses on the meaning and
extent of the exceptions to the marital privileges as they have been

1-"1 2 FEDERAL RULES, supra note 84, at 592.

This trend may be the result of increased
litigation which makes judges more concerned with removing barriers to the presentation
of evidence or to the decreasing acceptance of the value traditionally given to privileges.
Id.
132 Lempet, supra note 61, at 182.
M- Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against Other in
Prosecution for Offense Against Child of Both or Either, 93 A.L.R.3d 1018,1024 (1979).
'3
2 FEDERAL RULEs, supra note 84, at 635; see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46 n.7
(1980) (recognizing an exception to the adverse testimonial privilege when "one spouse
commits a crime against the other" or "crimes against children of either spouse"); United
States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding the confidential
communications privilege did not apply to "statements relating to a crime where a spouse
or a spouse's children are the victims"); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362,1366-67 (8th
Cir. 1975) (finding the adverse testimonial privilege did not apply when the spouse or his
or her children were victims of a crime committed by the other spouse); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 38, § 5.31, at 559. Uniform Rule of Evidence 504 recognizes an
exception to the marital privileges when a spouse is charged with a crime against the
person or property of "an individual residing in the household of either" and where the
victim is a third person if the crime is committed while committing a crime against the
spouse, a minor child of either." UNIF. R. EvID. 504; see also discussion infra Part III.
135 See Renee L. Rold, All States Should Adopt Spousal Exception Statutes, 55 J. Mo. B. 249, 252
(1999).
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developed by federal and military courts in regard to children who are
not "a child of either spouse." 136
1. The Federal Judiciary
The meaning and extent of this exception to the marital privileges
arose in several different cases, with a general trend toward increasing
the scope of the exception. United States v. Allery' 37 was a case of first
impression in the federal courts.'3 The court addressed the issue of
whether the exception to the adverse testimonial privilege, which allows
the adverse testimony of a spouse to be admitted when the alleged crime
involved an offense against the spouse, also allowed the adverse
testimony of a spouse to be admitted when the harm was directed
toward the defendant's child or stepchild. 139 The court recognized the
Advisory Committee's acknowledgment of the need to allow a spouse to
testify against the other spouse when an alleged crime had been
committed against "a child of either spouse." 140 The court decided to
expand the exceptions to the adverse testimonial privilege to include
crimes committed against "a child of either spouse" because "reason and
experience" demanded such a result.' 41 The court relied on the
conclusions that an offense against "a child of either spouse" is also an

This Part of the Note will not be divided into separate sections for the adverse
testimonial and confidential communications privileges because in practice both privileges
may and often do arise in the same case.
1.6

137 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975).
138 Id. at 1365. Mr. Allery was indicted prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of

Evidence. Id. at 1364 n.2. However, part of the language of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:
"[tlhe admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of
witness shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these
rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience" became part of Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
Id.
13 Id. Mr. Allery was accused of attempting to rape his twelve-year-old daughter. Id. at
1363. He had been drinking heavily on the night of the offense and testified that he did not
remember anything from the time he returned home to the time he woke up at the police
station. Id. His wife testified in a manner incriminating him. Id.
110Id.; see also 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 75, § 505App.01, at 505App.-1. The court
had also examined the legislative history of the rejection of this rule and concluded that
Congress' rejection of the rule "did not indicate that Congress disapproved of the
expansion of this exception but rather that any substantive changes should be done on a
case-by-case basis." Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366.
"I Allen, 526 F.2d at 1366.
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offense to both family harmony and society, that there is a need for
parental testimony in such cases, and the strong state support for such
an exception. 142 Later in Trammel, the Supreme Court recognized a
similar exception to the adverse testimonial privilege and indicated in a
footnote that such an exception also existed for the confidential
1 43
communications privilege.
This exception to the confidential communications privilege was
again examined in United States v. White. 144 In White, the court balanced
society's interest in protecting the integrity of marriages with a narrow
construction of privileges based on society's interest in the
administration of justice, and it concluded that the confidential
communications privilege should not apply when either the spouse or
the spouse's children were the victims of an offense committed by the

other spouse. 145 Although recognizing that Allery involved the adverse
testimonial privilege, not the confidential communications privilege, the
court found that the rationale in Allery was still applicable to the
146
expansion of exceptions to the confidential communications privilege.

Id. The court examined the policy behind the adverse testimonial privilege and
recognized not only the vitality of the justification of preserving family peace but also that
a "serious crime against a child is an offense against that family harmony and to society as
well." Id. Second, the court acknowledged the necessity for parental testimony in child
abuse prosecutions because more than 90% of reported instances of child abuse occur in the
home and that in those cases more than 87% of the abusers were either the parent or a
parent substitute. Id. Third, the court recognized a rule which "impedes the discovery of
truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of justice." Id. Fourth, the court
discussed the strong state precedent for the expansion of the exception to the privilege. Id.
at 1366-67, 1367 n.7. Finally, the court relied on the fact that at least eleven states had
already passed laws making the privilege inapplicable in cases of child abuse and neglect.
Id. at 1367.
M Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,46 n.7 (1980).
144974 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1992).
14s Id. at 1138. Joseph White was convicted of causing the death of his two-year-old
142

stepdaughter, Jasmine. Id. at 1137. Jasmine died from severe head injuries inflicted while
she was under the defendant's care at her mother's military residence. Id. The defendant
was frustrated with his role as caregiver and had previously threatened to kill his
stepdaughter and his wife if forced to continue caring for Jasmine. Id. The court reasoned
that to protect threats against the spouse or the spouse's children would be inconsistent
with the goal of the confidential communications privilege and that the public's interest in
justice outweighed any purpose of this privilege. Id. at 1138.
146 Id. The court also relied on a footnote in Trammel which noted the confidential
communications privilege did not apply to children of either spouse. Id. at 1138; see also
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46 n.7.
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United States v. Bahe147 further extended this exception to the
confidential communications marital privilege by recognizing an
exception for confidential communications relating to the abuse of a
minor child living in the home. 14 The court recognized the lack of
unanimous agreement in the courts as to the extent of this exception. 149
As a matter of policy, however, the court found that there was no
significant difference in crimes committed against a child of the married
couple compared to crimes committed against a stepchild or other minor
relative residing in the home. 50 Furthermore, the court considered child
abuse to be a "horrendous crime" that generally occurs in the home and
is usually hidden by the child's innocence or threats against the child.' 5'
Based on "reason and experience" the court concluded that it would be
unconscionable to allow a privilege based on promoting trusting and
loving communications to prevent a justifiably upset spouse from
2
testifying against such a spouse. 5
This privilege was also the source of dispute in United States v.
Martinez.'53 Although Martinez involved the abuse of a spouse's
biological children, the court relied on the reasoning and justifications of
Bahe, along with its own "reason and experience," to hold that the
confidential communications privilege should not apply when a crime
has been committed against a minor child. 54 The court reasoned that

147 128

F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1033 (1998).

14sId. at 1441. The court recognized an "exception to the marital communications privilege

for spousal testimony relating to the abuse of a minor child within the household." Id. at
1446. The defendant was charged with sexually abusing an eleven-year-old female relative
residing in his home. Id. at 1441. He was alleged to have penetrated her vagina with his
hand and finger. Id. His wife wanted to testify that sometimes when she was asleep her
husband tried to initiate sex by penetrating his hand and finger inside her vagina and
bending the finger into a hook shape and forcefully pulling it out. Id. The government
wanted to introduce this testimony because this was the same act described by the victim.
Id.
149Id. at 1446. The court specifically compared the broad scope of the Texas exception to
the confidential communications privilege for a crime against any minor child to both
Michigan's and the District of Columbia's narrow approach of only extending such an
exception to children of either spouse. See infra notes 176, 193,214 and accompanying text.
150Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1446.
Is'Id.

152Id. The court refused to prevent a "properly outraged spouse with knowledge from
testifying against the perpetrator of such a crime." Id.
15344 F. Supp. 2d 835 (W.D. Tex. 1999). The defendant was charged with numerous counts
of child abuse for injuring her two sons while the boys were patients at Wilford Hall
Medical Center, which is located at Lackland Air Force Base, a federal enclave. Id. at 836.
IN Id. at 835, 837.
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when a spouse is accused of child abuse, there is little marital harmony
left to preserve. 15 5 The court balanced the protection of children with the
preservation of marital harmony and decided that the preservation of
marital harmony must fall in favor of protecting children who cannot
defend themselves because they are voiceless, powerless, and vulnerable
to abuse. 156 The court reasoned that to allow any other result "would
make children a target population within the marital enclave." 157
2. The Military Justice System
The military adopted specific privileges because many
servicemembers were stationed in locations where they did not have
easy access to legal advice. 1 One of the primary authors of the MRE
indicated that the rules can and should be changed as society and the
law change, and that the structure of the rules should ensure that the
military justice system is at the forefront of criminal justice. 59 The
military justice system has addressed factual situations similar to the
issue that this Note addresses, but it has not yet judicially extended the
exception to the marital privileges to include scenarios such as
Michelle's.

1% Id. at 837.

1% Id. The court further reasoned that when a parent abuses a child, the reason for
protecting confidential marital communications must yield to protecting children. Id.
1'7Id. The court indicated that it had made a thorough search of the law and had not
found any authority precluding this exception in cases of child abuse. Id. The court
admitted, however, that it had not undertaken a historical review of the privilege or
searched "the dark comers of the world, nor that era when mankind lived within the
confines of a cave that might call for a contrary reason." Id.
1 Lederer, supra note 12, at 16. Specific privileges were included to "provide concrete
guidance to a world-wide criminal justice system which makes wide use of lay person in
disposing of criminal charges." MILITARY RULES, supra note 27, at 628. The rules were
written to provide certainty and predictability to military law. Lederer, supranote 12, at 37.
The worldwide dispersion of armed forces, the lack of legal advice and the need for
consistent procedures throughout the armed forces provide justification for the
intentionally "concrete" MRE. Id. The MRE recognize eight specific privileges: the lawyerclient privilege, clergy communications, the husband-wife privilege, the classified
information privilege, the government information other than classified information
privilege, the identity of informant, the political vote, and deliberations of courts and juries.
MIL. R. EvID. 502-509.
I Lederer, supra note 12, at 39. The co-author believed that the structure of the rules
"should ensure a vibrant military legal system at the forefront of criminal justice in the
United States." Id.
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In United States v. McElhaney,' 60 Staff Sergeant McElhaney was
accused of committing sexual offenses against his wife's niece.' 61 The
trial judge clearly indicated that the niece did not fall within the
exception for a crime against "a child of either spouse." 162 Instead, the
judge ruled that the marital privilege did not apply because the
defendant's sexual actions with the victim were a crime against the
wife.'16 The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that military law,

however, did not support such a conclusion. 164 The court reasoned that
whether a charged offense is a crime against a spouse depends not on an
outrage of emotion or a violation of the marital promises, but on a direct
relationship with the spouse's person or property. 165 This ruling led the
judges to note, sua sponte, that there may be a gap in the exceptions to the
marital privileges that the drafters should amend to include
MW
50 M.J. 819 (A.F.

Ct. Crim. App. 1999).

Id. at 822. The niece lived with the defendant and his wife. Id. After the prosecution
rested, the defendant indicated his intent to call his wife as a witness. Id. at 829. He then
requested that the military judge prohibit the prosecution from questioning her about a
statement that he had made to her. Id. The wife testified that the defendant had admitted
to attempting to have sexual intercourse with her niece but "got scared so they had to
stop." Id. at 830. She further testified that the defendant admitted to her that he loved her
niece and had previously kissed the niece Id.
161

162 Id.

Id. In addition to precluding the privilege when a crime is committed against a child of
either, MRE 504(c)(2)(A) also establishes that there is no privilege when a spouse is charged
"with a crime against the person or property of a third person committed in the course of
committing a crime against the other spouse." MIL.R. EVID. 504(c)(2)(A).
14 McElhianey, 50 M.J. at 830.
165 Id. The court stated "[w]hether an offense charged against one spouse injures the other
depends not upon the outrage to her sensibilities or a violation of the marital bonds, but
upon some direct connection with her person or property." Id. In United States v. Massey,
the court found that "carnal knowledge, even when incestuous, is not a direct injury to a
spouse" for purposes of the exception to the marital privileges, thus requiring something
more than conduct even if such conduct abuses privileges and responsibilities. 35 C.M.R.
246, 254-55 (C.M.A. 1965). The court concluded there must be a "direct, palpable invasion
of, or injury to, the interests of the witness." Id. at 255. However, in United States v.
Menchaca, the court made the holding of Massey obsolete by finding child abuse to be an
offense against the spouse. 48 C.M.R. 538, 540 (C.M.A. 1974). The court reasoned that the
effect of Massey was "not compatible with the needs of the military service, especially
overseas" where large groups of servicemembers and their dependents live in close
communities. Id. The court reasoned "[i]n these communities and generally in military
life, child beating and child molestation by parents cannot be tolerated and certainly
should not be facilitated by a rule of evidence." Id. Furthermore, because the privilege is
based on public policy, it should yield to greater public policy in the opposite direction. Id.
The McElhaney court found, however, that the statement was admissible because Staff
Sergeant McElhaney had waived the privilege when he told the victim's parents the same
information that he told his wife. McElhantey, 50 M.J. at 830.
163
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circumstances where a spouse is a guardian or in loco parentis to a
child.166 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 167
Judge Sullivan found that molesting a child is a crime against the
marriage even if the child was neither adopted nor a biological child. 168
He went on to explain that the confidential communications privilege
did not apply in that particular case because the niece was a de facto
child since the wife was the niece's guardian. 169

III. STATE EXCEPTIONS AND THE NEED FOR AN

AMENDED

MRE 504(C)(2)(A)

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern state court decisions, so
the states are free to establish their own evidentiary rules."70 As a result,
the states have developed a wide variety of exceptions to the marital
privileges.17' This Part describes the various approaches taken by the
states and explains both the need and the justifications for amending

I6 Id. at 830 n.6. The court noted "[t]his is a gap which the drafters may deem appropriate

to address by extending the exception to cover a child for whom either is the guardian or
stands In Loco Parentis [sic]." Id.
167 United States v. McElhaney, 54 M.J. 120 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
168 Id. at 137. He stated "lilt is a crime against the marriage for one spouse to molest the
other spouse's child, even though the alleged victim was neither a marital nor adopted
child of either spouse." Id. Judge Sullivan concluded the niece was protected by the
exception because the defendant's wife was the niece's guardian when the niece was
molested. Id. Chief Judge Crawford noted this distinction was not necessary to the
disposition of this case but agreed that "[i]t is a crime against the marriage for one spouse
to molest the other spouse's child .... even though the alleged victim was neither a marital
nor adopted child of either spouse." Id. at 134-35. (Crawford, C.J., concurring in part, and
dissenting, in part). Judge Sullivan had previously addressed this issue in United States v.
McCarty. 45 M.J. 334 (C.A.A.F. 1996). In McCarty, the appellant was convicted of sexual
misconduct with his niece. Id. at 334. Judge Sullivan believed the niece was a "de facto"
child of the appellant and his wife for purposes of MRE 504(c)(2)(A) because she had lived
with the appellant for ten years, from the time she was two until she was twelve. Id. at 336
(Sullivan, J., concurring). However, Judge Sullivan did not express which aspect of MRE
504(c)(2)(A) he was referring to. Id. Senior Judge Everett agreed with the rejection of the
spousal privilege because the wife's testimony was hearsay. Id. at 338 (Everett, S.J.,
dissenting). However, he recognized that the appellant and his wife had raised the niece as
their child for the last ten years, and that there was no doubt "the purpose behind refusing
the privilege to one accused of a crime against the couple's child would apply with equal
force where the child was in the custody of the couple and for many years had been raised
as their own." Id.
169McElhaney, 54 M.J. at 137.
170 FED. R. EVID. 101.
171Because courts-martial are criminal proceedings, this Note will only address exceptions
for criminal proceedings. However, many of the state statutes or rules of evidence address
both criminal and civil proceedings in the same section.
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MRE 504(c)(2)(A) to expand the exceptions to the martial privileges to
include situations where non-biological children are abused by an adult
in the home. Some states have taken a liberal approach and narrowed
the marital privileges so that there is no privilege in criminal
proceedings where the spouse is charged with a crime against the person
or property of the other spouse, a child of either spouse, or a person
residing in the home of either.1 72 Other states, and the military, have
limited such an exception to include only those offenses committed
against the spouse or "a child of either spouse." 173 A third approach has
been to limit such exceptions to the marital privileges to only those
crimes committed against the other spouse, but includes certain crimes
against children as crimes against the spouse. 74 Other states have
chosen to only deal with a spouse's competency to testify, while still
others have chosen to adopt an exception for crimes committed against a
child over whom either spouse is a guardian. 17 The problem with this
wide variety of approaches is deciding which type of exception would
solve the problem at hand and would be justified by military needs.
A. State Exceptions to the Marital Privileges
1. The Exception For Crimes Against a Spouse, a Child of Either, or
Persons Residing in the Home
This broad exception to the martial privileges prevents the
application of such privileges when a spouse has committed an offense
against the other spouse, a child of either spouse, or against any other
person residing in the home.176 Only a few states have, however, clearly

172See discussion iifra Part 1II.A.1.

See discussion infra Part l1l.A.2.
17 See discussion iifra Part 1II.A.3.
175 See discussion infra Parts I11.A.4-5.
"7
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1999) (adopting the Uniform Rules of
Evidence for proceedings in state courts; Rule 504(d) created an exception to the husbandwife privilege when "one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of
(1) the other, (2) a child of either, (3) a person residing in the household of either"); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 972(e)(1) (West 1995) (creating an exception to the adverse testimonial
privilege during a criminal proceeding when a spouse is charged with "[a] crime against
the person or property of the other spouse or of a child, parent, relative, or cohabitant of
either"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2504(D) (1993) (providing that there is no privilege when a
spouse is charged with a "crime against the person or property of: (1) the other; (2) a child
of either; (3) a person residing in the household of either"); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-13-15
(Michie 1995) (establishing that there is no confidential communications privilege when a
spouse is charged with a "crime against the person or property of (1) the other, (2) a child
"73
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indicated what children were meant to be included in the phrase "a child

of either, (3) a person residing in the household of either"); ALA. R. EVID. 504(d)(3)
(establishing that there is no exception to the husband-wife privilege in"acriminal action
or proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property
of (A) the other spouse, (B)a minor child of either, (C) a person residing in the household
of either"); DEL. R. EVID. 504(d) (specifying that there is no privilege when a "spouse is
charged with a wrong against the person or property of (1) the other, (2) a child of either,
(3) a person residing in the household of either"); HAw.R. EVID. 505(c)(1) (eliminating the
spousal privilege when a spouse commits a crime "against the person or property of (A)
the other, (B) a child of either, (C) a third person residing in the household"); IDAHO R.
EVID. 504(d)(2) (creating an exception to the husband-wife privilege in criminal
proceedings "in which a spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of
(A) the other spouse, (B)a person residing in the household of either spouse"); KY. R. EVID.
504 (creating an exception to both the adverse testimonial privilege and the confidential
communications privilege when a spouse is charged with an offense against "(A) The
other; (B)A minor child of either; (C) An individual residing in the household of either...
The court may refuse to allow the privilege in any other proceeding if the interests of the
minor child of either spouse may be adversely affected"); ME. R.EvID. 504(d) (designating
there is no husband-wife privilege in proceedings where a spouse is charged "with a crime
against the person or property of (1) the other, (2) a child of either, (3) any person residing
in the household of either"); Miss. R.EViD. 504(d) (indicating there is no husband-wife
privilege when a spouse is charged with "a crime against (1) the person of any minor child
or (2) the person or property of (i) the other spouse, (ii) a person residing in the household
of either spouse"); N.D. R. EvID. 504(d) (specifying that there is no privilege when a
"spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of (1) the other, (2) a child
of either, (3) a person residing in the household of either"); TEX. R. EvID. 504(a)(4)(C)(b)(4)(A) (establishing there is no confidential communications privilege or adverse
testimonial privilege in proceedings where the spouse is accused of a crime against "the
spouse, any minor child, or any member of the household of either spouse"); UTAH R. EVID.
502(c) (indicating there is no confidential communications privilege in any proceeding
where a "spouse is charged with a crime or tort against the person or property of (i) the
other, (ii) a child of either, (iii) a person residing in the household of either"); VT. R.EVyD.
504(d) (providing that there is no confidential communications privilege when a spouse is
charged with a crime "against the person or property of (1) the other, (2) a child of either,
(3) a person residing in the household of either"); Rhode Island v. Angell, 405 A.2d 10, 1516 (R.I. 1979) (finding that § 12-17-10 altered the common-law confidential communications
privilege to allow a spouse to testify to confidential communications not involving a crime
against the spouse or a child of either); cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
2000) (establishing an exception to the confidential communications privilege by requiring
a spouse to disclose confidential communications when the "suit, action, or proceeding
concerns or is based on child abuse or neglect, the death of a child, criminal sexual conduct
involving a minor, or the commission or attempt to commit a lewd act upon a minor"). But
see W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4 (1997) (prohibiting a spouse from testifying about confidential
communications). One reason for the popularity of this broad exception is the growing
concern for the prevention of crimes against children. See Fisher v. Mississippi, 690 So. 2d
268, 269, 272 (Miss. 1996) (amending Rule 504(d) because of the "growing concern about
sexual and violent abuse against children" in a case where an uncle was charged with
raping his eleven-year-old niece).
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of either spouse." For purposes of this exception, Alabama's Advisory
Committee clearly expressed its intent that the term "child" was not
intended to be limited to a natural child.1' The Committee specifically
referred to Daniels v. State,178 which established a general policy of
construing such privileges narrowly, especially in cases of child abuse.179
The court found the phrase "child of either spouse" was sufficiently
broad enough to include those crimes committed against foster
children. 8 0 The court reasoned that the promotion of family harmony
must yield to the policy of preventing child abuse because the court
found there was not a good reason to limit the protection of children to
only adopted or natural children.' 8'

In Munson v. State,182 the Supreme Court of Arkansas addressed the
meaning of the word "reside" as used in the Arkansas statute.183 The

ALA. R. EVID. 504(d)(3) (advisory committee's note).
681 P.2d 341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 345. The Daniels' foster child, a thirteen-year-old girl, had only lived with them
for about two and a half months. Id. at 342. The court also relied on cases from
Washington state which further narrowed the privilege. Id. at 344; see also infra notes 231-34
and accompanying text.
1 Daniels, 681 P.2d at 345; see also infra note 193 (providing the text of Alaska's exception).
Mrs. Daniels argued that Alaska's exception should only apply to natural or adopted
children. Daniels, 681 P.2d at 343. The court noted that neither the text of the rule nor the
commentary clarified what children were intended to be included in the phrase "a child of
either." Id. The state argued that the placement of a foster child in a licensed foster home
created a legal relationship between the foster parents and the foster child. Id.
1M1 Id. at 345. In Dunn v. Superior Court of Orange County, the court found that considering a
foster child as a "child of either" was consistent with the legislative intent because allowing
the privilege to shield those foster parents killing or abusing children would conflict with
the foster care's goal of protecting children. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
The court indicated no other California case had dealt with the issue of whether a foster
child was a "child" for purposes of applying the privilege and that the legislative history
on this issue was silent. Id. at 366. The court reasoned that "many foster parents develop
close, loving personal relationships with their charges" and that in those circumstances
injury to the child by a spouse would be harmful to the marriage. Id. Even if foster parents
viewed the relationship as a business deal, harm to the foster child would not promote
marital harmony. Id. Furthermore, the length of the residence was not determinative since
once the spouses entered the formal agreement they created a sufficient relationship for
purposes of this exception. Id. at 367. Even if the court had not found the foster child to be
a child of either, the child would have been protected under the cohabitant exception. Id. at
368; see also California v. Siravo, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the
argument that cohabitant implies sexual relations and instead found the "appropriate
definition of cohabitants in this case is two people who live or dwell together in the same
household").
M82
959 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ark. 1998).
177

17
17
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victim, Mrs. Munson's fourteen-year-old sister, had been visiting the
Munson home for about a week when she was attacked by the
defendant. 184 The defendant moved to suppress certain letters he had
written to his wife in which he had reminded her of their wedding vows,
asked her for her forgiveness, and admitted that he had made a mistake
but that it was not entirely his fault.18 Utilizing accepted rules of
statutory construction, the court determined the word "reside" was
meant to be interpreted based upon the purpose of the statute. 18 6 In the
context of Rule 504, "reside" was found to apply to the circumstances of
this case because the victim's temporary "residence" in that home would
have presented the same opportunity to the defendant had she intended
to remain indefinitely. 8 7
Similarly, in Huddleston v. State,18 the Texas Court of Appeals
refused to apply the marital privileges where the husband was accused
of raping a ten-year-old child.18 9 The statute specifically recognized that
there was an exception to the husband-wife privilege when "an accused
is charged with a crime against the person of any minor child or any
member of the household of either spouse." 190 The defendant had
argued that the phrase "of either spouse" modified "any minor child." 91
The court, however, rejected this argument finding instead that the
statute made it clear that the exception applied to any minor child, not
192
simply "a child of either spouse."

Id. at 392. The court defined the issue as whether the victim was "residing" at the home
at the time of the offense. Id.
193

184Id.
185 Id.
18
197

Id. at 393.

Id.

IN 997 S.W.2d 319 (rex. App. 1999).
189 Id. at 321. The victim testified that the appellant had convinced her to accompany him
to his house where she could earn money by washing dishes. Id. at 320. After she finished
washing the dishes, the appellant grabbed her, taped her mouth, and then raped her. Id.
190 Id.

Id. If the court had accepted this argument, the result would have been that the
appellant's wife was unable to testify because the victim was not a child of the appellant or
his wife. Id.
192 Id. at 321. The appellant's argument would have resulted in the conclusion that the
exception did not apply if the victim was not a child of either spouse. Id. This same
argument, but for a prior statute, was addressed in Ludwig v. State. 931 S.W.2d 239 (rex.
Crim. App. 1996). In that case, the court also found that the exception applied even if the
child was not a child of either spouse. Id.at 244. The court relied on the legislative history
191
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2. The Exception For Crimes Against the Spouse or a Child of Either
Another common exception to the marital privileges is for crimes
committed against either the spouse or "a child of either spouse." 193

to conclude that the exception to the confidential communications privilege was not meant
to only protect children of either spouse. Id.
19 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 985(a) (West 1995) (stating there is no confidential marital
communications privilege when one spouse is charged with "[a] crime committed at any
time against the person or property of the other spouse or a child of either"); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.504(3)(b) (West 1999) (establishing there is no husband-wife privilege when a
spouse is charged with a crime against the other spouse or a child of either); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-428(b)(3) (1994) (establishing exceptions to the confidential communications
privilege "in a criminal action in which one of them is charged with a crime against the
person or property of the other or of a child of either"); LA. CODE EViD. ANN. art. 504(C)(1)
(West 1995) (creating an exception to the confidential communications privilege "[i]n a
criminal case in which one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of
the other spouse or of a child of either"); 2000 Mich. Legis. Serv. 128 (West) (stating that "a
husband shall not be examined as a witness for or against his wife without her consent or a
wife for or against her husband without his consent, except as [follows]: . . . In a
prosecution for a crime committed against a child of either or both" or where a spouse
commits a personal wrong or injury against the other); NEB. REv. STAT. 27-505(3)(a) (1995)
(creating an exception to the confidential communications privilege when a crime is
committed against a "child of either"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(b)(5)-(c) (1999) (specifying
that "[in a prosecution of one spouse for any other criminal offense against the minor child
of either spouse, including any illegitimate or adopted or foster child of either spouse" the
spouse is competent and may be compelled to testify but shall not be compelled "to
disclose any confidential communication" made during the marriage); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.42 (Anderson 1997) (indicating a spouse "shall not testify concerning a
communication made by one to the other" unless in the case of an offense against the
spouse for cruelty to their children); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255(4)(a) (1999) (denoting that
there is no husband-wife privilege in criminal actions when a spouse is charged with an
"offense or attempted offense against the person or property of the other spouse or of a
child of either"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Michie 2000) (establishing a spouse may be
compelled to be a witness against the other spouse in prosecutions for crimes against the
spouse or a child of either but may not testify to privileged communications); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 905.05(3)(b) (West 2000) (indicating there is no confidential communications
privilege when a spouse is charged "with a crime against the person or property of the
other or of a child of either"); ALASKA R. EvID. 505(a)(2)(D)(i), 505(b)(2)(A) (establishing
that there is no adverse testimonial privilege or confidential communications privilege
when one spouse is charged with a "crime against the person or the property of the other
spouse or of a child of either"); N.M. R. EVID. 11-505(D) (indicating there is no husbandwife privilege "in proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime against the
person or property of the other spouse or a child of either"). Under Colorado's exception
for crimes against the spouse, the courts have found that an offense committed against the
spouse includes various crimes against children or step-children. See, e.g., Jordan v. People,
419 P.2d 656, 661 (Colo. 1966) (finding indecent liberties against the wife's child, the
defendant's step-child, was a crime against the wife); Balltrip v. People, 401 P.2d 259, 263
(Colo. 1965) (finding the murder of a spouse's child also constituted an offense against the
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However, various states have interpreted the meaning of "a child of
either spouse" differently. Alaska has, for example, interpreted the
phrase "a child of either spouse" to include foster children."94 The court
adopted this interpretation because it believed that there was no good
reason for a foster child to not have the same protection as a natural or
5
adopted child.9
Conversely, in People v. Clarke,'% the Supreme Court of Michigan
refused to allow a spouse to testify against the other spouse in a
prosecution for a crime committed against a child who was not "a child
of either spouse." 1 7 The defendant was accused of taking indecent
liberties with a child who was not a child of either spouse. 1" The court
did not find the crime to be either an offense against the wife or an
offense against "a child of either spouse."'" The court believed that the
legislature's intent, when it amended the statute to allow a spouse to
sign a complaint in an action involving a crime against the spouse or a
child of either, was not to change the law by allowing a spouse to sign
such complaints in actions involving children who were not "a child of
either spouse." M° The court reasoned that, as a matter of public policy,
the statute's purpose was to protect confidential communications.' The
exception to the privileges was only designed to permit the prosecution

spouse making the marital privilege inapplicable). Louisiana has not adopted any
exceptions to the adverse testimonial privilege because the privilege may not be exercised
by the defendant, although the confidential communications privilege allows the defendant
to bar the victim spouse from testifying. State v. Taylor, 642 So. 2d 160,165-66 (La. 1994).
19 See supranotes 178-81 and accompanying text.
19 Daniels v. State, 681 P.2d 341, 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); see also State v. Michels, 414
N.W.2d 311, 316 (Wis. CL App. 1987) (finding a foster child to be a "child of either" in order
to prevent crimes within the family from going unpunished because the purpose of such an
exception is to protect minor children who are part of the family structure from criminal
acts).
196 114 N.W.2d 338 (Mich. 1962).

Id. at 340. The defendant was accused of taking indecent liberties with an eleven-yearold girl who had lived with the Clarkes since shortly after her birth. Id. at 339. The wife
signed the complaint upon which the arrest warrant for the defendant was based. Id.
19 Id. The wife testified that the victim was not her child and that she was not sure if the
defendant had legally adopted the victim, but she thought the defendant was the victim's
father. Id. The defendant denied being the father of the victim. Id.
197

199 Id.
2m

2M

Id. at 340.
Id.
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of crimes committed within the family unit because such crimes would
have no other witnesses and would therefore go unpunished. 202
3. The Exception For Crimes Committed Against the Other Spouse
Some states have chosen to establish an exception only for those
offenses that are committed against one spouse by the other. 2°3

Inevitably, these states have developed differing interpretations of what
constitutes an offense against a spouse. For example, in State v. Ulin,' 4
the Arizona Supreme Court recognized an exception to both marital
privileges "whenever the testifying spouse's child or relative is
endangered by the other spouse." 205 The court recognized that although
prior cases had only recognized such an exception for the adverse

testimonial privilege, the same reasoning applied to the confidential
communications privilege. 20 6 In a prior case, the Arizona Supreme Court
had reasoned that when a spouse commits a crime that so intimately

212Clarke, 114 N.W.2d at 340.
2 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(1) (West 2001) (providing that a spouse shall
not be examined against his or her spouse without the other spouse's consent, as to events
or communications occurring during the marriage, but that these exceptions will not apply
in a "criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by the husband against the wife,
or by the wife against the husband"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(a)(l) (West
Supp. 2000) (creating an exception to the confidential communications privilege in criminal
proceedings where a spouse is charged with a crime against the other spouse); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-84a (1994) (establishing that a husband or wife whose spouse committed a
violent act against him or her may be compelled to testify as any other witness); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (2000) (establishing a spouse may not testify to confidential
communications unless the spouse is accused of committing a crime against the other
spouse"); MONT.CODE ANN. § 26-1-802 (1999) (providing that a spouse may testify against
another spouse "for a crime committed by one against the other"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 112-101, 104 (Michie 1999) (establishing that a spouse may not testify to confidential
communications "except in criminal proceedings for a crime committed by one against the
other"); see also State v. Littlejohn, 508 A.2d 1376, 1387 (Conn. 1986) (stating that the
Supreme Court of Connecticut had "never explicitly held that confidential communications
between husband and wife were privileged under the common law" of that jurisdiction).
2 548 P.2d 19 (Ariz. 1976).
2m Id. at 23. In Ulin, the husband had committed second-degree murder of his wife's
daughter, his step-daughter. Id. On August 29, 1974, the defendant could not find his
comb. Id. at 20. When his wife's daughters were unable to find the comb, the defendant
physically punished the girls and then made them spend the rest of the day in bed. Id.
Later that day, the defendant went to the girl's room and found the victim had wet her bed.
Id. He became extremely upset and hit the victim with such force that she urinated and
had a bowel movement. Id. A few hours later the victim was found unconscious and taken
to the hospital where she died from head injuries. Id. at 20-21.
m Id.at 23.
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affects the other spouse as to violate the marriage, the reason for the rule
and its protection were inapplicable. 207
In State v. Howell,208 however, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
declined to determine whether such an exception could be interpreted to
include an offense against a child to whom a spouse has an in loco
parentis relationship. 209 The court defined "in loco parentis" as those
circumstances where a person was placed in the situation of a parent by
intentionally assuming the obligation of being a parent but without
going through a formal adoption.2 0 The court found that Mrs. Howell's
relationship with the victim was no more than that of a baby-sitter and
2
that she had not intended to assume the status of parent to the child. "
Consequently, the court found there was no reason to determine
whether she had been acting in loco parentis and, therefore, whether her
testimony would have been privileged. 212 The court refused to adopt an

w"State v. Crow, 457 P.2d 256, 263 (Ariz. 1969); see also State v. Whitaker, 544 P.2d 219, 224
(Ariz. 1975) (finding that because the wife and her child were potential victims of the
defendant's assault her testimony was admissible); 'Loughlin v. People, 10 P.2d 543, 54647 (Colo. 1932) (allowing a husband to testify against his wife who was charged with
killing her step-daughter because the purpose of the rule and its protection were
eliminated by the murder); Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280, 284 (Wyo. 1960) (reasoning
that the rape of a wife's daughter by her husband was an offense against the wife because
the crime against her daughter "undoubtedly caused as great or, more likely, even greater
pain and suffering to the mother" than any violence against the wife). Even Professor
Wigmore stated that in a liberal view any injury to a spouse's child was a wrong to the
spouse and thus made the spouse's testimony admissible. 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 49, § 2239, at 3060.
= 596 P.2d 277 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
2 Id. at 278. The defendant's wife cared for the victim for four and a half hours a day, five
days a week, while the victim's mother attended school. Id. After the victim's mother
found a very large bruise on the victim's buttocks, she reported the bruise to the police. Id.
When the police questioned the defendant's wife, her statement allowed an inference that
the defendant was responsible for the bruise. Id. The defendant was then charged with
child abuse. Id. at 277.
210Id. at 278. In loco parentis occurs when a person "puts himself in the situation of a lawful
parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without going
through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption ....However, the person must intend
to assume toward the child the status of the parent." Id. The State argued that the
defendant's wife was acting as in loco parentis to the child because she had acted as the
child's mother. Id. The defendant's wife had fed the victim, attended to the victim's
medical needs, loved the victim, and given the victim attention and chastisement, but the
court found these acts were insufficient to characterize the relationship as in loco parentis.
Id.
211 Id.

212Id. at 277.
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argument that such an extension to the exception to the martial
privileges should be adopted on grounds of necessity. 213
4. Statutes Only Dealing With a Spouse's Competency to Testify
Some states have created statutes dealing only with a spouse's
competency to testify.214 For example, in criminal proceedings in the
District of Columbia, a spouse is not competent to testify to any
confidential communications. 215 This incompetency is not an absolute
bar to testimony regarding confidential communications because in

Id. The State argued that the privilege should be narrowly construed and that
exceptions to the privilege should be broadly interpreted. Id. The court refused to apply
this theory because the court was bound to follow the evidentiary rules that had been
adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court. Id. at 279. The court characterized its role as
determining whether the privilege is applicable but found insufficient facts to raise an issue
about the applicability of this exception. Id.
n4 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306(b) (1995) (indicating that in criminal proceedings "a husband
or his wife is not competent to testify as to any confidential communications made by one
to the other during the marriage"); see also IND. CODE § 34-46-3-1 (1999) (specifying that a
spouse is not required to testify about communications made to each other); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 622.9 (West 1999) (stating that "[n]either husband nor wife can be examined in any
case as to any communication made by the one to the other while married, nor shall they,
after the marriage relation ceases, be permitted to reveal in testimony any such
communication made while the marriage subsisted"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §
9-105 (1998) (providing that "[olne spouse is not competent to disclose any confidential
communication between the spouses occurring during their marriage"); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
546.260(1-2) (West 1987) (specifying a spouse may testify at his or her option but may not
"disclose confidential communications had or made between them in the relation of such
husband and wife"); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502 (McKinney 1992) (stating a "husband or wife shall
not be required, or, without consent of the other if living, allowed, to disclose a confidential
communication made by one to the other during marriage"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10.1
(2000) (stating that a spouse may be ordered to testify against the defendant in cases of
abuse against the spouse or a child of either); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1997) (prohibiting a
spouse from testifying against a spouse except where the spouse is charged with an offense
against the spouse or the "child, father, mother, sister or brother of either of them"); N.H.
R. EviD. 504 (establishing a spouse shall not be "allowed in any case to testify to any matter
which in the opinion of the court would lead to a violation of marital confidence"). Rhode
Island's statute has been interpreted to allow a spouse to voluntarily testify to confidential
communications between the spouses. State v. Angell, 405 A.2d 10, 15-16 (R.I. 1979).
Although Indiana has recognized the confidential communications privilege, it does not
recognize the adverse testimonial privilege. State v. Roach, 669 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (Ind.Ct.
App. 1996). Although New York has established that confidential communications shall
not be disclosed, the courts have created an exception to this privilege by finding an offense
against a child of a spouse also constitutes an offense against that spouse. People v.
Allman, 41 A.D.2d 325, 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
21-

213 D.C. CODE ANN. 9 14-306 (1995).
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Johnson v. United States,21 6 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia recognized an exception based on necessity that allows a
spouse to testify to confidential communications when a crime has been
committed against the spouse or a child of either spouse.21 7 The court
reasoned that such an exception had already been judicially recognized
to the adverse testimonial privilege, and therefore, it necessarily
followed that such an exception to the confidential communications
privilege was proper.21 8 The court's rationale for this exception to the
confidential communications privilege was that any other result would
give a spouse the license to injure the other spouse in secret with full
immunity. 219 The court further reasoned that because the necessity
exception already prevented the martial privileges from silencing an
injured spouse, it should also prevent the privileges from silencing the
only person who can communicate on behalf of an injured child.20
Similarly, Missouri's statute establishing that a spouse may not
testify to confidential communications is also subject to exceptions for
offenses committed against the spouse and for offenses committed
against a child of either, as any crime committed against a child of the
family is the equivalent of an offense against the spouse.22 1 Missouri has

-6 616 A.2d 1216 (D.C. 1992).

17 Id. at 1220. In Johnson, the defendant was charged with the murder of his eight-month
old daughter. Id. at 1218. When the defendant's common law wife returned from work she
noticed a bruise on the baby's right temple. Id. Her husband told her that the baby had
fallen off the bed. Id. Later that same night, he took the baby into the bathroom where he
smacked her for two or three minutes with a belt because she kept crying. Id. Expert
medical evidence indicated the baby's death was caused by blunt force to the head. Id. at
1219 n.5; see also Morgan v. United States, 363 A.2d 999, 1004 (D.C. 1976) (recognizing
confidential communications about injuries to one spouse by the other spouse are
admissible as a necessity).
218 See Johnson, 616 A.2d at 1224; see also United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362,1367 (8th Cir.
1975). While recognizing that the "marital confidential communications privilege is almost
sacrosanct" the court reasoned that "it would be illogical for the court to conclude that the
privilege is not a bar when the husband inflicts an injury on the wife" but is a bar when the
husband kills their child. Johnson, 616 A.2d at 1224.
219 Johnson, 616 A.2d at 1225.
m Id. The court reasoned that to the extent that parents are the persons most likely to
witness a crime against their children, the criminal who kills his or her own children would
have greater immunity because the killer could silence the spouse through application of
the marital privilege. Id. The court also indicated that allowing such testimony would not
likely harm the marriage because the marriage was most likely already in a state of
disrepair and preventing the testimony would more likely frustrate justice than promote
family peace. Id.
m State v. Brydon, 626 S.W.2d 443,453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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further extended this exception to include foster children because the
Supreme Court of Missouri found that foster children logically fall
within the same family structure as children of either spouse. 2m
5. Exception For Offenses Committed Against a Child of Either or
Children in Their Care
Some states have expanded the exception to the marital privileges
for crimes against "a child of either spouse" to specifically include
offenses committed against children who are in the care or custody of
either spouse.22 The justification for this exception is that the reasons for
m Id. The defendant and his wife were foster parents to a fifteen-year-old girl. Id. at 446.
The girl and her brother had lived with the Brydons for three years. Id. After the victim
reported the defendant engaged in unwanted sexual intercourse, the defendant's wife
telephoned a private counselor to seek professional counseling. Id. at 446-47. The
defendant, his wife, and the foster child visited the therapist where they were informed
that she "would have to report this." Id. at 446. The defendant then indicated that he "felt
badly about the situation," was concerned about the foster child, and felt he needed
counseling. Id. Thereafter, the counselor reported the abuse to Family Services. Id.
2
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-23(a-b) (1995) (establishing a spouse is "competent, but not
compellable, to give evidence against the other spouse in a criminal proceeding" but that
such privilege "shall not apply in proceedings in which the husband or wife is charged
with a crime against the person of a minor child, but such person shall be compellable to
give evidence only on the specific act for which the defendant is charged"); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/115-16 (West 2001) (establishing a spouse may testify to confidential
communications in cases where a spouse is "charged with an offense against the person or
property of either ...when the interests of their child or children or of any child or children
in either spouse's care, custody, or control are directly involved"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
595.02(1)(a) (West 2000) (establishing that there is no confidential communication privilege
in a "criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other or
against a child of either or against a child under the care of either spouse"); NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. 49.295(2)(e)(1) (Michie 1996) (indicating there is no marital privileges in a "[c]riminal
proceeding in which one spouse is charged with: A crime against the person or property of
the other spouse or of a child of either, or of a child in the custody or control of either,
whether the crime was committed before or during marriage"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A17 (West 1994) (requiring a spouse to testify to criminal actions "against the spouse, a child
of the accused or of the spouse, or a child to whom the accused or the spouse stands in the
place of a parent"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913(2) (West 2000) (establishing that there
is no adverse testimonial privilege "in any criminal proceeding against either for bodily
injury or violence attempted, done or threatened upon the other, or upon the minor
children of said husband and wife, or the minor children of either of them, or any minor
child in their care or custody, or in the care or custody of either of them"); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5914 (West 2000) (refusing to allow the disclosure of confidential
communications unless the privilege is waived); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201(c)(2) (2000)
(creating an exception to the inadmissibility of confidential communications in proceedings
concerning the abuse of a spouse "or abuse of a minor in the custody or under the
dominion and control of either spouse"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West 1995)
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admitting confidential marital communications regarding crimes
committed against such children outweigh the justifications for the
existence of such a privilege.2 4
Furthermore, maintaining the
confidentiality of communications regarding violent acts in order to
foster a stronger marriage directly conflicts with the rational norms of a
family oriented society because the benefits of exposing such abuse
clearly outweigh any injury the disclosure of such communications
would cause the marriage.2 -s
In People v. Burton,226 the defendant was accused of engaging in
incestuous acts against his two stepdaughters.w The issue in Burton was
whether the defendant's trial for incest could be classified as a case
where the interests of the children were directly involved. If not, then
the marital privileges would apply and the wife would not be able totestify against her husband. 28 The Illinois Court of Appeals considered
it irrelevant that the victims were the defendant's stepchildren, finding
instead that the exception was designed to protect all children within the
family relationship and to only protect natural children would violate

(creating an exception to the confidential communications privilege when a spouse
commits a crime against the other spouse or when a spouse commits a crime against "any
child of whom said husband or wife is the parent or guardian"). Pennsylvania's statutes
have been interpreted as meaning the "spousal privilege simply does not exist in criminal
proceedings where violence has been done or threatened upon a minor child in the care of
custody of the spouse/defendant." Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 565 A.2d 782, 786-87
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). The court found that the purpose of this exception was to protect
both spouses and children from domestic violence. Id. at 786. The court then reasoned that
this protective policy clearly outweighed the marital harmony justification of preventing
the disclosure of confidential marital communications. Id.
224 See Adams v. State, 563 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tenn. Crim.App. 1978). The defendant was
convicted of the first degree murder of his four-year-old step-son. Id. at 805. The victim
was reported missing on August 17, 1975, which resulted in a massive search for the boy.
Id. The boy's body was found three days later at the bottom of a steep grade. Id. The
victim had died as the result of a severe beating and had suffered numerous injuries to the
head. Id. The defendant's wife testified that the defendant beat the boy after he vomited at
the table while the defendant was eating. Id. at 806.
23 Id. at 809. The court noted the growing number of jurisdictions recognizing the need to
protect children outweighed the policy of protecting marital relationships. Id.
- 429 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
227 Id. at 545. At the time of trial the girls were eight and nine years old. Id. On a family
vacation, the girls informed their mother about the defendant's behavior. Id. When the
wife confronted the defendant, he denied the accusations and wanted to punish the girls.
Id. The mother then insisted that they speak to the girls before punishing them. Id. When
the girls repeated the same story in front of the defendant, the defendant asked his wife to
go to another room where he admitted the girls were telling the truth. Id.
2nld. at 546.
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the legislative intent of protecting children.229 The court found that the
interests of the girls were within the statute's purpose because society
has a greater public policy concern in protecting children from sexual
and physical abuse than preserving confidential marital communications
about such acts.230
In addition, Washington addressed the issue of what constitutes a
"guardian" in State v. Modest.231 In Modest, the Washington Court of
Appeals found the term "guardian" included those people who acted in
loco parentis to a child, even for short periods of time.232 The court
indicated that although a determination of the existence of a
guardianship relationship was based on the facts and circumstances of
each case, the court must also consider the legislative intent to promote
233
successful prosecutions of such behavior or treatment toward children.

22 Id.

= Id. at 547.
944 P.2d 417 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). The defendant was accused of directing a
prostitution ring while in the Yakima County Jail. Id. at 419. The defendant told his
girlfriend, his wife at the time of trial, where to send the girls and herself, what clothes
should be worn, what should be charged for various sexual acts, and to put the money into
his jail account. Id.
m3 Id. at 421. The court stated that the "guardianship exception applies when any spouse
acts in loco parentis, meaning when he or she assumes the parental character or discharges
parental duties, even if for a very short time." Id. In State v. Waleczek, the Supreme Court
of Washington stated that "a guardian, like a parent, ordinarily connotes a person in loco
parentis." 585 P.2d 797, 800 (Wash. 1978). The court then defined in loco parentis as "one
who means to put himself in the situation of a lawful parent to the child ... one who has
put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the
parental obligations without going through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption."
Id. at 799. The court further indicated the legislature and public were concerned with the
physical and sexual abuse of all children, not just certain situations of abuse. Id. at 799.
The court found the defendant and his wife had voluntarily undertaken parental duties
when they allowed the victim to sleep over at their house, waked her for school, gave her
breakfast, and made sure she attended to school. Id. at 800-01; see also State v. Wood, 758
P.2d 530, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a neighbor created a guardian
relationship over a young child when the child simply played with the neighbor because
"when an adult engages in play with another's child, he or she takes on a 'parental dut[y],'
albeit one less onerous than others").
2 Modest, 944 P.2d at 421. The court found a liberal construction of the term guardian
supported the application of this exception to this case. Id. The accused had determined
who lived in the house with his wife. Id. He also directed the girls to pay his wife for being
allowed to stay there, requested their attendance at the jail, ordered punishment via the
telephone, and required them to follow his stringent rules. Id.; see also State v. Lounsbery,
445 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Wash. 1968) (describing the legislative intent as facilitating disclosure
in child abuse cases, "so that the offenders might be punished and the children protected
231
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Based on this concern for children, the court found that "guardian"
should be liberally interpreted to punish child abusers and thus protect
children.234
B. The Need for an Amended MRE 504(c)(2)(A)

The word "child" in MRE 504(c)(2)(A) can be interpreted as having
several legitimate, yet fundamentally different, meanings. As written,
the language of MRE 504(c)(2)(A) is unclear as to what is the exact
meaning of "a child of either spouse." Not only does MRE 504(c)(2)(A)
not contain a definition, but the drafter's analysis is also silent on this
issue.235 One possible interpretation is that MRE 504(c)(2)(A) only
provides an exception to the marital privileges when an offense is
committed against children of whom one of the spouses is a biological
parent. A second interpretation is to include adopted, or possibly even
foster children, in the meaning of "a child of either spouse."236 A third
plausible interpretation includes those children who have as a guardian
one of the spouses.2 37 These interpretations are possible given that the
statutory language does not specifically refer only to biological parents.
Furthermore, some military judges have utilized what appears to be
a rather complex analysis when deciding whether a marital privilege is
applicable under MRE 504(c)(2)(A) when an offense is committed against
a child who is a not "a child of either spouse." Under this analysis, the
court first determines whether the victim is a de facto child of either
spouse; it then decides whether the offense against the de facto child also
constitutes an offense against the spouse, in which case neither of the
marital privileges apply.23
However, it is possible to interpret MRE
504(c)(2)(A) so that neither of the marital privileges is applicable once it
is determined that the victim was a de facto child of a spouse, thus
making the second determination unnecessary. If the victim is a de facto
child of either spouse, then it would be easier to simply conclude that
from further mistreatment" and that limiting parent to only a natural or adoptive parent
would frustrate such a purpose).
2m Modest, 944 P.2d at 421.
233 See MILITARY RULES, supra note 27, at 657.
236There is no case on point but based on analogy to some of the other state laws, this is a

permissible interpretation.
27 This interpretation has not yet been accepted by the military courts. See McElhaney, 50
M.J. 819, 830, n.6 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999); see also infra note 280 and accompanying text
(explaining the meaning of in loco parentis).
23 See supra notes 160-169 and accompanying text.
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neither privilege applies since the victim was "a child of either spouse."
This analysis would produce the same result as a conclusion that the
victim was a de facto child and that the offense against the child was also
an offense against the spouse. Therefore, determining whether an
offense against that child also constitutes a crime against the marriage
needlessly complicates the analysis. As written, MRE 504(c)(2)(A) does
not specify that crimes against a de facto child are an exception to the
privileges, but neither does it make clear that such offenses are covered
by the current exception. Both the unclear meaning of the phrase "a
child of either spouse" and the complicated analysis could be remedied
by a rule that clearly states what is meant by "a child of either spouse."
C. Justificationsfor Amending MRE 504(c)(2)(A)
First, Article 36 of the UCMJ gives the President the power to create
regulations over courts-martial - subject to the limitation that
evidentiary rules generally recognized in criminal cases in the United
States district courts be applied as much as practicable. 239 At this time,
only the Tenth Circuit has decided to extend the exceptions to the
marital privilege beyond that for crimes committed against the spouse or
a child of either.240 However, the current trend in the area of privileges is
to extend the exceptions to privileges. 241
Potentially, the current version of the rule may violate the Equal
Protection Clause. MRE 504 might be unconstitutional if there is not a
reasonable justification for allowing a spouse to testify to confidential
communications concerning biological children while simultaneously
refusing to allow the testimony of similar communications involving de
facto children who are abused or even murdered. Although the
classification, "a child of either spouse" versus all other children residing
in the home is only subject to rational basis review, if the distinction is
arbitrary or capricious it will nonetheless violate the Equal Protection

r9 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. In addition, MRE 501 (a)(4) provides for both
the codified privileges and those generally recognized privileges "in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts pursuant to rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence insofar as the application of such principles in trials by courts-martial is

practicable and not contrary to or inconsistent with the code, these rules, or this Manual."
MIL R. EVID. 501(a)(4).
240 See sipra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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Clause, and therefore, be unconstitutional. 242 The purpose of the
exception to the marital privileges for crimes involving children is to
protect children from such abuse. 243 Even military courts have indicated
that, in "military life, child beating and child molestation by parents
cannot be tolerated and certainly should not be facilitated by a rule of
evidence." 244 If such behavior is not to be tolerated by parents, then
there is even less reason to accept such behavior from those people who
are acting in loco parentis or as a guardian of a child. Therefore, it can be
argued that it is illogical to protect only biological or adopted children
when other children are in similar danger. To do so could result in a
target population for abuse because the criminal spouse could always
prevent his or her spouse from testifying to confidential communications
concerning the abuse of children in the target population.2 5 This is
especially important given the increasing number of children who are
not living with their parents, but are living with some other relative,
family friend, or in a foster home.24 6
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for amending the rule is the
nature of military life. The military requires single parents and dual
military families, those families with both parents in the military, to
establish Family Care Plans on an annual basis. 247 A Family Care Plan is

Discrimination based on race or national origin is subject to strict scrutiny, so that a law
will only be "upheld if it is proven necessary to achieve a compelling government
242

purpose."

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CoNsrTTIONAL LAW:

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 529

(1997). Discrimination based on gender or against non-marital or illegitimate children is
subject to intermediate scrutiny. Id. Intermediate scrutiny requires a law to be upheld if
the law is "substantially related to an important government purpose." Id. The distinction
involved in MRE 504(c)(2)(A) is not based upon the legitimacy of the child but simply the
fact that the child is not a biological child of either spouse. Therefore, MRE 504(c)(2)(A) is
subject to rational basis. Any law not subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny is subject to
rational basis. Id. Rational basis, the minimum level of scrutiny, only requires that a law
be "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Id. Furthermore, "a law
should be upheld if it is possible to conceive any legitimate purpose for the law, even if it
was not the government's actual purpose." Id. at 535. The burden of proving the law is
irrational is on the challenger and because the test is so deferential to the government, laws
are rarely found invalid. Id. at 530.
243 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
244 United States v. Menchaca, 48 C.M.R. 538,540 (C.M.A. 1974).
24- See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 3.
247 Appendix I - Family Care Plans, at http://www.wood.army.mil/ig/inspecto.htm#
APPENDIX J (last visited Nov. 21, 2001); see also The Community and Well Being, at
http://www.army.mil/aps/aps-ch5_4.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2001) (stating that
approximately 35,000 soldiers in the United States Army are single parents).
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the means by which a servicemember arranges for the care of his or her
dependents, so that the servicemember is available for duty wherever
and whenever military needs dictate, without the interference of family
responsibilities. 248 In essence, this means that the military requires, as
part of military readiness, that servicemembers name someone they trust
as a guardian for their child or children, so the servicemember can leave
on a moment's notice. As a result, the military has created a special
community of children who are residing in homes where the child is no
longer "a child of either spouse." Because this requirement is based on
the military's need for servicemembers to be able to entirely devote
themselves to their military responsibilities, the military should extend
the exception to the marital privilege to protect such children. This
additional protection for children would help reduce any fears of
servicemembers that their child could be subject to abuse without the
perpetrator being prosecuted simply because a spouse is ineligible to
testify. Ideally, servicemembers are able to trust that whomever they
have entrusted with their children would treat the children as if they
were family. However, given the current statistics of child abuse and
neglect, a servicemember can still reasonably fear for the safety of his or
her children.
Regardless of whether a spouse is taking care of another
servicemember's child or a member of his or her own family, an offense
against that child will likely create havoc in the marital relationship due
to the violation of trust or destruction of the spouse's expectations of
their spouse. 249 Such havoc could even destroy the marital relationship
because of the violation of trust. When a spouse commits an offense
against a child who, for any variety of reasons, has become part of the
family, such an offense becomes more like a crime against the spouse.
This happens because the spouse was responsible for protecting that
child and when that protection is breached, that spouse considers such
an offense to be an affront to that spouse because of the violation of their
expectations and beliefs. Therefore, to enact such an amendment would,
if not protect children from abuse, at least vindicate their rights because
a spouse would be eligible to testify against the abusive spouse. In turn,
this would help ensure that servicemembers are focused on their military
duties and would not allow the marital relationship to act as a shield

249 Appendix J - Family Care Plans, at http://www.wood.armiy.mil/ig/inspecto.htm#

APPENDIX J (last visited Nov. 21, 2001).
249See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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against prosecution for crimes that in all likelihood might not survive
such offenses.
Although Allery limited the exceptions for the adverse testimonial
privilege to offenses against a spouse or a child of either, the reasoning in
Allery supports the proposed extension of the exception to the marital
privileges. 250 The court examined five factors in determining, that based
on "reason and experience," the exception to the adverse testimonial
privilege should be extended. 25' First, the court reasoned that a serious
crime against a child is an offense against family harmony, which the
privilege was designed to protect.25 2 This offense to family harmony
does not fail to exist simply because a spouse has committed a
horrendous crime against a non-biological child rather than a biological
child. This is true because it would be a shock to a spouse when he or
she discovers the capability of their spouse to commit such acts.
Consequently, a balance of the protection of the integrity of marriage
with society's interest in justice, leads to the conclusion that society's
interest in administering justice outweighs the interest in protecting
marriages.2 3 If a spouse is "properly outraged" by the other spouse's
conduct, it makes no sense to prohibit that spouse from testifying against
the abuser based on a privilege that promotes trusting and loving
communications. 254
The second justification is that parental testimony is necessary for
child abuse prosecutions. 2 5 Even the Supreme Court has recognized the
difficulty of prosecuting child abuse because usually the only witness to
the crime is the child. 6 This difficulty is not reduced simply because the
victim is not a biological child of the abuser, as the abuser is generally a
close and trusted family member.257 To allow a spouse to testify only

250See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text. In extending these exceptions to the
confidential communications privilege in White, the court also relied upon the reasoning of
Allery. See United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992).
21 See United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (8th Cir. 1975).
25 See supranote 142.
m See supranote 145 and accompanying text.
25 See supranote 152 and accompanying text.
2- See supranote 142.
2 See supranote 2.
2s See supra note 2.
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about offenses to biological children could create a target population
consisting solely of non-biological children.258
Third, any rule impeding the discovery of truth still impedes justice,
regardless of who the victim may be.259 Fourth, several state courts have
recognized such an exception. 260 Moreover, many states have adopted
an even broader exception covering any minor child or any person
residing in the household.261 The Tenth Circuit has also recognized an
exception to the confidential communications marital privilege "for
crimes committed against a minor relative in the defendant's
household. 262 Fifth, at that time Allen was decided, eleven states had
passed statutes making the privilege inapplicable in cases of child abuse
and neglect.263 Currently, such a statute or a similar statute has been
almost unanimously adopted by the states.264

2" See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
I" See supra note 142.
21
6

See supra note 142.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.

M See supra note 142.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (1975) (establishing the "doctrine of privileged
communication ... shall not be a ground for excluding any evidence regarding a child's
injuries or the cause thereof in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to
this chapter"); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060 (Michie 2000) (providing the husband-wife
privilege is not a ground for "excluding evidence regarding a child's harm, or its cause, in a
judicial proceeding related to a report made under this chapter"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-3620(G) (West 2001) (indicating that the confidential communications privilege "shall
not pertain in any civil or criminal litigation or administrative proceeding in which a
child's neglect, dependency, abuse ... is an issue"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-518(1) (Michie
1999) (establishing the confidential communications privilege is not "grounds for excluding
evidence at any proceeding regarding child abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect"); CAL EVID.
CODE § 985(d) (West 1995) (creating an exception to the confidential communications in
criminal proceedings for the neglect of a person's child); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6401.1 (West 1999) (indicating the husband-wife privilege "shall not be available for
excluding or refusing testimony in any prosecution of an act of child abuse"); DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (Supp. 2000) (indicating that the husband-wife privilege shall not apply
to situations of child abuse or neglect); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1355 (2000) (establishing the
husband-wife privilege is not grounds for excluding evidence "concerning the welfare of a
neglected child; provided, that a judge... determines such privilege should be waived in
the interest of justice"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (West Supp. 2001) (abrogating the
confidential communications privilege for "any communication involving the perpetrator
or alleged perpetrator in any situation involving known or suspected child abuse... or
neglect"); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-23(a-b) (1995) (compelling a spouse to provide evidence
against his or her spouse but "only on the specific act for which the defendant is charged");
HAw. REV. STAT. § 350-5 (1993) (providing that the "spousal privilege.., shall not be
2"
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grounds for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report of child
abuse or neglect pursuant to this chapter"); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Michie 1998) (creating
an exception to the confidential communications privilege in proceedings for the "case of
physical injury to a minor child where the injury has been caused as a result of physical
abuse or neglect by one or both of the parents"); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-16 (1998)
(allowing a spouse to testify to confidential communications in criminal proceedings
"when the interests of their child or children or of any child or children in either spouse's
care, custody, or control are directly involved"); 735 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/8-801 (1998)
(specifying that in civil actions there is no confidential communications privilege "where
the custody, support, health, or welfare of their children or children in either spouse's care,
custody or control" is in issue); IND. CODE § 31-32-11-1 (1999) (providing the husband-wife
privilege "is not a ground for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding resulting from
a report of a child who may be victim of child abuse or neglect"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.74
(West 2000) (abrogating the confidential communication privilege in "proceedings
resulting from reports of child abuse"); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(2) (Banks-Baldwin
2000) (establishing the husband-wife privilege is not a ground for "excluding evidence
regarding a... neglected, or abused child" resulting from a report of child abuse); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B) (West Supp. 2001) (providing that "[in any proceeding concerning
the abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child.., evidence may not be excluded on any
ground of privilege"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4015 (West 1964) (abrogating the
spousal privileges when "giving evidence in a child protection proceeding"); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2000) (allowing a spouse to testify to confidential
communications in proceedings involving abuse of children under the age of eighteen);
MICH. COMP. LAwS § 722.631 (West 1993) (abrogating the marital communications privilege
in a "civil child protective proceeding" resulting from a report of child abuse); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02(1)(a) (West 2000) (establishing that there is no confidential communications
privilege in cases of neglect); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (West 1996) (specifying that no
privileged communication shall "apply to situations involving known or suspected child
abuse or neglect and shall not constitute grounds for failure... to give or accept evidence
in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16212(1)(c) (1999) (providing that a spouse may testify to confidential communications when
"the defendant-spouse has been charged with abuse, abandonment, or neglect of the other
spouse or either spouse's children"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707(2) (1995) (establishing the
confidential communications privilege does not exclude testimony for prosecutions
involving crimes against the family); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.255 (Michie 2000)
(indicating that in proceedings resulting from reports of child abuse the report or contents
"shall not be excluded on the ground that the matter would otherwise be privileged against
disclosure"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (1994) (abrogating the confidential
communications privilege in proceedings involving child abuse); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-45(A) (Michie 1999) (indicating reports of child abuse or neglect will not be excluded "on the
ground that the matter is or may be the subject of a . . . privilege or rule against
disclosure"); N.Y. FANI. CT. Acr § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (stating the
confidential communications privilege is not "a ground for excluding evidence which
otherwise would be admissible"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57.1 (1999) (providing that "the
husband-wife privilege shall not be ground for excluding evidence regarding the abuse or
neglect of a child"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (1999) (abrogating the confidential
communications privilege "in any proceeding regarding child abuse, neglect, or death
resulting from abuse or neglect resulting from a report made under this chapter"); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (1997) (allowing a spouse to testify to confidential
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communications in civil or criminal proceedings for neglect or cruelty to their children);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7113 (West 1998) (establishing in proceedings resulting from a
report of child abuse the report "shall not be excluded on the ground that the matter is or
may be the subject of a . . . privilege or rule against disclosure"); OR. REV. STAT. §
419B.040(1) (1999) (indicating that "[i]n the case of abuse of a child... the husband-wife
privilege... shall not be a ground for excluding evidence regarding a child's abuse"); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6381(C) (West Supp. 2000) (specifying the confidential
communications privilege "shall not constitute grounds for excluding evidence at any
proceeding regarding child abuse or the cause of child abuse"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11
(1997) (abrogating the confidential communications privilege in "situations involving
known or suspected child abuse or neglect"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1999) (providing that a spouse is required to disclose confidential communications
when the case "is based on child abuse or neglect"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-15 (Michie
1999) (indicating the confidential communications privilege "may not be claimed in any
judicial proceeding involving an alleged abused or neglected child"); TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-1411 (1996) (establishing the husband-wife privilege is not sufficient grounds for
"excluding evidence regarding harm or the cause of harm to a child in any ... neglect
proceedings resulting from a report of such harm ...or a criminal prosecution for severe
child abuse"); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.11 (Michie 1995) (making the husband-wife
privileges inapplicable in proceedings resulting from reports of child abuse or neglect);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 1995) (creating an exception to the confidential
communications privilege when a spouse commits a crime against the other spouse or
when a spouse commits a crime against a "child of whom said husband or wife is the
parent or guardian"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-7 (Michie 1999) (abrogating the
confidential communications privilege "in situations involving suspected or known child
abuse or neglect"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210(a)(i) (Michie 1999) (implementing a rule
that evidence in proceedings resulting from a report of child abuse or neglect "shall not be
excluded on the ground that it constitutes a privileged communication" between spouses);
see also State v. Waleczek, 585 P.2d 797, 800 (Wash. 1978) (finding the husband-wife
privileges were "subordinated to the overriding and paramount legislative intent to protect
children from physical and sexual abuse"). A few states have adopted rules or statutes that
are less clear whether the confidential communications privilege is abrogated in child
abuse proceedings. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West 1994) (establishing that if a
spouse is charged with cruelty or abuse of a child that the other spouse may be "compelled
to testify in the same manner as any other witness"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428(b)(3) (1994)
(establishing exceptions to the confidential communications privilege "in a criminal action
in which one of them is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other or
of a child of either"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106(a)(1) (1998) (compelling a
spouse to testify as an adverse witness if the charge involves abuse of a child under
eighteen); Miss. R. EvID. 504(d) (indicating there is no husband-wife privilege when a
spouse is-charged with "a crime against (1) the person of any minor child or (2) the person
or property of (i) the other spouse, (ii) a person residing in the household of either
spouse"); TEX. R. EViD. 504(a)(4)(C)-(b)(4)(A) (establishing there is no confidential
communications privilege or adverse testimonial privilege in proceedings where the
spouse is accused of a crime against "the spouse, any minor child, or any member of the
household of either spouse"); UTAH R. EVID. 502(b)(4)(C) (indicating there is no confidential
communications privilege in any proceeding where a "spouse is charged with a crime or
tort against the person or property of (i) the other, (ii) a child of either, (iii)
a person
residing in the household of either"); VT. R. EViD. 504 (providing that there is no
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Furthermore, one of the goals of codifying the MRE was that all
future military evidentiary rules would follow the Federal Rules of
Evidence, unless there was a valid military reason for departure from the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 265 The interpretation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 has led to broader exceptions for the marital privileges.2"
There does not appear to be a valid military reason for departing from
this trend of protecting children from physical or sexual abuse. Indeed,
based on the Family Care Plan requirement, there seems to be a valid
military reason for such an exception.

confidential communications privilege when a spouse is charged with a crime "against the
person or property of (1) the other, (2) a child of either, (3) a person residing in the
household of either"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05(3)(b) (West 2000) (indicating there is no
confidential communications privilege when a spouse is charged "with a crime against the
person or property of the other or of a child of either"). It appears that only New Jersey has
dearly decided not to eliminate the confidential communications privilege in cases of child
abuse or neglect. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21 (West Supp. 2000), Senate Institutions, Health
and Welfare Committee Statement (indicating in cases of child abuse or neglect the
legislature reinstated "the privilege of confidentiality in communications between husband
and wife"). Furthermore, some states have not limited the abrogation of this privilege to a
child of either spouse. See, e.g., State v. Salzman, 679 P.2d 544, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(applying this exception to include communications about child abuse when the victim was
not a child of either spouse); Villalta v. Commonwealth, 702 N.E.2d 1148,1152 (Mass. 1998)
(finding that the phrase "proceeding related to child abuse" was not limited to a child of
either spouse but included the abuse of any child). The issue of how such a rule interacts
with the statutes or evidentiary rules about the marital privileges is beyond the scope of
this article because it is for the judiciary to determine which statute or rule applies. See
People v. Corbett, 656 P.2d 687, 689 (Colo. 1983) (finding because of the existence of the
Child Protection Act the marital privilege could not be used to prevent the wife from
testifying in a case where her husband was alleged to have sexually assaulted the wife's
eleven-year-old sister); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 439 (Iowa 1982) (finding when
judicial proceedings result from a report of child abuse, Section 232.74 prevented
application of any marital privileges); Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Ky.
1997) (finding the statute making the spousal privilege inapplicable in child abuse cases did
not interfere with Rule 504 but enhanced the rule by refusing to allow the husband-wife
privilege to act as a shield). But see State v. Martinez, 872 P.2d 708,713 (Idaho 1994) (stating
that to the extent that statutory provisions conflict with Idaho Rules of Evidence, the
statutory provision has no force or effect); Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 722 A.2d 702, 707-08
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding that the Child Protective Services Law stating, "a privilege of
confidential communication between husband and wife or between any professional
person... shall not constitute grounds for excluding evidence at any proceeding regarding
child abuse or the cause of child abuse," did not abrogate the confidential communications
privilege in criminal proceedings).
2 See supra note 34.
26 See supra discussion Part II.C.1.
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR AN AMENDED MRE 504(C)(2)(A)

Such policy considerations and the unique nature of military life
should guide the determination of whether to extend the exceptions to
the marital privileges under MRE 504(c)(2)(A). As currently written,
MRE 504(c)(2)(A) is not only potentially incapable of protecting certain
groups of children, but it is also vague as to the meaning of who is "a
child of either spouse."267 This Part proposes an amended version of
MRE 504(c)(2)(A) and explains how the amended rule would have
applied in Michelle's situation.2"
A. The ProposedAmendment to MRE 504(c)(2)(A)
MRE 504(c)(2)(A) is similar to those rules fitting into the second
category of state approaches: those recognizing the only exception to the
marital privileges is for offenses committed against the spouse or "a
child of either spouse." 269 This Part proposes to solve the problems of
the meaning of "a child of either spouse" and to simplify the analysis of
whether the marital privileges apply. The only change being proposed
to MRE 504 is to allow a spouse who is acting as a guardian or in loco
parentis over a child to testify to confidential communications, thus
adversely to the spouse, when a spouse is accused of a crime against a
child over whom a spouse is the guardian or in loco parentis.270 The
following text is the language of MRE 504 with the proposed change in
italics:
Military Rule of Evidence 504. Husband-Wife Privilege.
(a) Spousal incapacity. A person has a privilege to refuse to
testify against his or her spouse.
(b) Confidential communication made during marriage.
A person has a
(1)
General rule of privilege.
privilege during and after the marital relationship to
refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from

wb See supra Part IlI.B.
See commentary infra Part IV.A.
21 See discussion supra Part Ill.A.2.
vu Although not following the identical language of the Washington statute posed by the
military judges as an appropriate model, this statute would cover the same groups of
children. See supra notes 166, 223, 231-34 and accompanying text.
2"
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disclosing, any confidential communication made to the
spouse of the person while they were husband and wife
and not separated as provided by law.
(2)
Definition. A communication is "confidential" if
made privately by any person to the spouse of the
person and is not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those reasonably necessary for
transmission of the communication.
(3)
Who may claim the privilege. The privilege
may be claimed by the spouse who made the
communication or by the other spouse on his or her
behalf. The authority of the latter spouse to do so is
presumed in the absence of evidence of a waiver. The
privilege
will not prevent disclosure of the
communication at the request of the spouse to whom the
communication was made if that spouse is an accused
regardless of whether the spouse who made the
communication objects to its disclosure.
(c) Exceptions
(2)
Spousal
incapacity
communications.
There is
subdivisions (a) or (b):

and
confidential
no privilege under

(A) In proceedings in which one spouse is
charged with a crime against the person or property
of. the other spouse, a child of either, a child under the
custody or control of either spouse in a guardianship
or in loco parentis relationship, or with a crime
against the person or property of a third person
committed in the course of committing a crime
againstthe other spouse; or 2- 1

zn

The remainder of the rule states:
(B) When the marital relationship was entered into with no
intention of the parties to live together as spouses, but only for the
purpose of using the purported marital relationship as a sham, and
with respect to the privilege in subdivision (a), the relationship

remains a sham at the time the testimony or statement of one of the
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol36/iss1/3
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Commentary
This amendment is designed to help protect children and to reduce
the number of military personnel who are abusing children that are not
"a child of either spouse" but, nonetheless, are under the custody or
The motivation for this proposed
control of one of the spouses. m2
amendment is the fact that each year over three million children are
abused, with a child being sexually assaulted every two minutes.tM

Furthermore, these crimes usually occur in private by someone whom
the victim loves and trusts, so there are no witnesses 27 4 A corollary to
construing privileges narrowly is to construe exceptions to privileges
broadly.27 5 Therefore, in case of any ambiguity this rule should be
construed broadly in an attempt to provide children, not the abusive
spouse, the greatest amount of protection possible.
This amendment is designed to eliminate the ambiguity in MRE
504(c)(2)(A). The amended rule will protect biological children, foster
children, adopted children, and children over whom a spouse is a
guardian or stands in loco parentis. Therefore, it will no longer be

parties is to be introduced against the other; or with respect to the
privilege in subdivision (b), the relationship was a sham at the time of
communication; or
(C) In proceedings in which a spouse is charged, in
accordance with Article 133 or 134, with importing the other spouse as
an alien for prostitution or other immoral purpose in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1328; with transporting the other spouse in interstate
commerce for immoral purposes or other offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424; or with violation of such other similar statutes
under which such privilege may not be claimed in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts.
MIL. R. EvID. 504.
2 See supra note 4.
27 See supra note 2.
274 See supra note 2.
M73
See State v. Eveans, 660 N.E.2d 240, 246-47 (I1. App. Ct. 1996) (stating that a corollary to
construing privileges narrowly is to construe the child interest exception broadly "to afford
the greatest protection to children rather than to the abusive or murderous spouse" and
construing this exception to apply when "either spouse has the care, custody, or control of
any child not only at the time of trial, but also at the time of the offense"). Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has recently adopted a more permissive view to the creation of new
privileges. Ricafort, supra note 48, at 259. For example, the Supreme Court in Jaffee v.
Redmond, recognized a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege because the protection of
confidential communications between a psychotherapist and his or his patient "promotes
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence." 518 U.S. 1, 910 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,51 (1980)).
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relevant whether the victim is "a child of either spouse." Furthermore,
such an amendment will not require that for the exception to apply the
offense be committed against a spouse or "a child of either spouse"
because it solves the current rule's inability to protect non-biological
children from abuse.
The phrase "child under the custody or control of either spouse in a
guardian or in loco parentis relationship" is meant to include situations even
if there is no paper documentation to such effect. Not only should this
determination be based upon the facts and circumstances of each case, 276
but the amendment's purpose of protecting children should also be a
significant consideration in any case. For purposes of this amendment, a
spouse is not required to go to court to become the child's guardian.
Such a requirement would defeat the purpose of this amendment, which
is to protect all children residing in the home, regardless of their legal
relationship to either spouse.
In this amendment, the term guardian is not used in the legal sense.
The legal definition of guardian is "[o]ne who has the legal authority and
duty to care for another's person or property, [especially] because of the
'
other's infancy, incapacity, or disability."M
Rather, the term guardian is
meant to include a quasi-guardian, or guardian by estoppel, which is
'
defined as "a guardian who assumes that role without any authority."m
The reason for such an interpretation is that the military does not require
a person to go to court and obtain such legal authority over a child to
recognize that person as the temporary guardian of that child.2
The
definition of guardian as used in this amendment is also meant to
include those spouses acting in loco parentis or "acting as a temporary
guardian of a child."2 This amendment is not designed to include those
children that are only occasional or overnight guests in a household.
Therefore, not every child who is abused will be covered by this
exception to the marital privileges.
Although the protection of children is the focus of this amendment,
the exception is meant to protect only those children who have for some

M See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
supra note 8, at 712.
m Id. at 713.

277 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,

m See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, slpra note 8, at 791; see also suspranote 232 and accompanying
text.

2w
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reason become part of the family unit. To allow all children to be
covered by such an exception would completely erode the marital
privileges and would do so without sufficient justification. The reason
for such a limitation to the marital privileges is that when a spouse
commits an offense against a child who has become a part of the family
unit, such a crime becomes comparable to an offense against the spouse.
The reason for this is because the spouse is responsible for the protection
of that child, and that protection is violated when an offense is
committed against that child. The amendment is, therefore, designed to
protect a larger category of abused children by eliminating the need for
determining whether the victim is a de facto child and that the crime also
constituted an offense against the spouse.
B. Applying the Amendment to Michelle281
In determining whether Michelle would have been protected by this
amendment, the first step is to determine whether Michelle was under
her sister's control or custody. This requires looking to the unique facts
and circumstances of the case.282 Michelle was visiting her sister for the
summer and while Michelle was there, Kathy can best be described as
acting as a mother for Michelle. Kathy took care of all of Michelle's basic
needs and necessities because Michelle was unable to take care of herself.
Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, Kathy can best be
described as having an in loco parentis relationship with Michelle. As
such, Kathy would be allowed to testify about the confidential
communications between herself and her husband, thus increasing the
likelihood of obtaining a conviction of rape.
V. CONCLUSION

The Military Justice System, though substantially similar to the
civilian criminal justice system, does not allow a spouse to testify to
confidential communications unless the communication is about an
offense committed against the spouse or "a child of either spouse." This
limited exception does not meet the purpose of such an exception: the
protection of children from abuse in the home. The current trend in the
area of privileges is to broadly expand the exceptions to the marital
privileges. An exception to the marital privileges covering minor

m See discussion sapra Part I.
2

See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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children over whom a spouse is guardian or in loco parentis would meet
this goal and would help servicemembers effectively perform their
military duties while deployed because they would have an increased
belief in the security of their children.
Kimberly Ann Connor
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